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Foreign fighters have been engaged in conflicts for hundreds of years, but the 
sheer number of foreign fighters who travel to Iraq and Syria during the last five years is 
unprecedented. The United States is not sure what to do with American ex-foreign 
fighters who leave their group and want to return to the States and peacefully reintegrate 
back into society, since currently there is no reintegration program for ex-foreign fighters. 
This thesis explores how the United States can develop an ex-foreign fighter reintegration 
strategy using existing, analogous models. This study identifies two groups that possess 
similar characteristics to foreign fighters: U.S. street gangs and the U.S. military. 
Utilizing the conceptual frameworks of street gangs and the military, the conceptual life-
cycle of foreign fighters is detailed to ascertain the practicality of developing a  
foreign-fighter reintegration program utilizing the existing reintegration programs of 
street gangs and the military. Based on the findings that foreign fighters, street gang 
members, and formerly deployed service members are very similar, I recommend the 
development of a multidisciplinary reintegration program for retuning ex-foreign fighters 
using specific aspects of each previously referenced reintegration program. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The number of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria and Iraq between 2011 
and 2015—including those from the United States—to join Islamic State (I.S.) and other 
Islamic foreign fighter groups is unprecedented. The issue for the United States is that 
since foreign fighter membership peaked in early 2015, it has been steadily decreasing. 
Some foreign fighters have been killed but others have become disillusioned with their 
group and their purpose for being a foreign fighter and have disengaged to return home or 
elsewhere to peacefully reintegrate back into society.1 This poses an immediate security 
concern for the United States: what to do with U.S. foreign fighters who depart the 
conflict area and want to peacefully return to the United States and reintegrate back into 
society. 
To address this question, this research project first identifies groups from within 
the United States that have existing reintegration programs that appear analogous to 
Islamic foreign fighters. Street gangs and the military, specifically the National Guard, 
are two groups with members who seem equivalent, in terms of the cognitive process of 
joining their respective group, to Islamic foreign fighters; the experiences and activities 
they partake as members of their group and the physical and cognitive process of 
disengaging from their groups are broadly comparable. U.S. street gangs utilize the 
Comprehensive Gang Model as their primary reintegration strategy,2 and the U.S. 
military, including the National Guard, employ Total Force Fitness as their primary 
reintegration model.3 
Prior to applying these reintegration strategies to construct an ex-foreign fighter 
reintegration strategy, the conceptual life-cycle of U.S. street gang members and National 
                                                 
1 Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into 
Syria and Iraq,” Soufan Group, 2015, 7, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.  
2 “Resources and Tools,” National Gang Center, 2016, https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Resources. 
3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chairman’s Total Force Fitness Framework,” CJCSI 
Directive 3405.01. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 2011, A-1, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3405_01.pdf. 
 xiv 
Guard members were independently deconstructed into three parts: joining their group, 
supporting their group, and disengaging and desisting from their group. Using the gang 
member and National Guard member life-cycles as independent frameworks, the life-
cycle of foreign fighters was mapped to assess the similarities and differences between 
gang members and National Guard members, and foreign fighters. The research reveals 
that individual and group identity as well as group-sanctioned violence are two primary 
aspects of all three groups. The research also reveals that U.S. gang members and foreign 
fighters progress through similar cognitive processes to join their groups, and National 
Guard members and foreign fighters share similar experiences and activities that 
experienced by members of both groups during deployments. Members from all three 
groups go through role transition as they disengage from their group and attempt to 
acquire a new identity. An additional factor identified for some formerly deployed 
National Guard members, which may affect some returning ex-foreign fighters, is that 
they suffer from a variety of post-traumatic stress disorders as a result of their 
deployment. 
Based on the noted similarities between U.S. street gang members and National 
Guard members to Islamic foreign fighters, an ex-foreign fighter reintegration model was 
constructed utilizing applicable components of the Comprehensive Gang Model and 
Total Force Fitness strategy. The resulting multidisciplinary reintegration strategy was 
designed to address the various motivations that caused individuals to initially become 
foreign fighters as well as the reasons that foreign fighters decide to disengage from their 
group and reintegrate back into society. Religious identity, acceptable use of violence, 
excitement, adventure, revenge, and financial benefits are all factors that motivate 
individuals to become foreign fighters. These factors are also important to foreign 
fighters as they contemplate disengagement from their group and is addressed by the ex-
foreign fighter reintegration strategy. The last aspect of the ex-foreign fighter 
reintegration strategy is Suppression. Suppression is based on a relationship between the 
criminal justice system and ex-foreign fighters, whereby the ex-foreign fighter is 
constantly reminded of the negatives of foreign fighter group membership or association, 
to proactively prevent any type of relapse. It also enables local law enforcement to 
 xv 
reassure citizens that the ex-foreign fighters who reside in their communities are not a 
threat. Overall, the proposed ex-foreign fighter reintegration strategy addresses ex-
foreign fighters holistically, utilizing existing and proven components of the 
Comprehensive Gang Model and Total Force Fitness. 
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In March 2016, United States military officials declared that Islamic State (IS) 
also called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), the principal benefactor of the largest global convergence of Islamic foreign 
fighters in history, was on the way to being defeated.1 The officials stated that the amount 
of territory under IS control was being reduced, and the number of foreign fighters within 
IS had declined for the first time since 2014; countless foreign fighters had been killed, 
while others had become disillusioned and defected to return home or settle elsewhere.2 
Overall, foreign fighter membership in IS had reached a high of roughly 38,000 in early 
2015, but was down to approximately 19,000–25,000 as of March 2016.3 
While a reduction in the territory under IS control coupled with a decrease in the 
foreign fighter population is a positive development in the fight against IS in Syria and 
Iraq, this development poses a security question for the United States domestically: what 
to do with U.S. foreign fighters who leave IS and other foreign fighter groups and 
sincerely want to return to the United States and reintegrate peacefully, even if they may 
still believe in the ideas that originally motivated them to become a foreign fighter? 
As of November 2016, the United States lacks a national strategy to reintegrate 
returning ex-foreign fighters. This thesis explores the possibility of reintegrating those 
foreign fighters who do not harbor any nefarious plans and want to return to the United 
                                                 
1 Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign 
Fighter Travel (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 6, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf; Evan Horowitz, “ISIS Is Losing. Will That Make It 
More Dangerous?,” Boston Globe, March 30, 2016, https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/03/
30/isis-losing-will-that-make-more-dangerous/cRn9rJl94cZmXHuOkr9hOK/story.html. 
2 Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into 
Syria and Iraq,” Soufan Group, 2015, 7, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.  
3 “TSG IntelBrief: Foreign Fighters and Those Who Return,” Soufan Group, March 9, 2016, 
http://Soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-foreign-fighters-and-those-who-return/.  
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States and reintegrate peacefully back into society.4 The United States must develop a 
strategy that addresses the needs of returning ex-foreign fighters. Rather than attempt to 
develop a reintegration strategy from nothing, one option is to leverage existing 
reintegration programs designed for individuals with similar needs to ex-foreign fighters. 
For example, two groups that have existing reintegration programs are U.S. street 
gangs and the U.S. military, specifically formerly deployed National Guard members.5 
The primary street gang disengagement and reintegration strategy in the United States is 
the Comprehensive Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Model 
(Comprehensive Gang Model), which is supported by the federal Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), a multidisciplinary strategy designed to 
assist gang members leave their gang and reintegrate into society.6 The principal 
reintegration strategy for formerly deployed National Guard members is Total Force 
Fitness (TFF), which is managed by the Department of Defense (DOD). TFF is a 
multidisciplinary strategy that addresses the mental, physical, and spiritual well-being of 
National Guard members and their families.7 The DOD works with several organizations 
to assist National Guard members before, during, and after returning from deployments to 
reintegrate into their families and society.8 
                                                 
4 This cohort of foreign fighters, who desire peaceful reintegration back into society, will be referred 
to as ex-foreign fighters throughout this thesis. A foreign fighter who has left the conflict area but still 
maintains membership with a foreign fighter group and may be a threat to United States, for this thesis, 
remains a foreign fighter. 
5 These two groups are not the only ones to meet the criteria, but they demonstrate the greatest 
similarities in terms of group membership based on a shared common identity, and exposure to violence 
and/or deployment experiences as a result of membership. The researcher acknowledges that gangs and 
service members exist in numerous countries, but for this research project and further reference to gangs, 
street gang members, or military service members means U.S. gangs, U.S. street gang members, and U.S. 
service members.  
6 “Resources and Tools,” National Gang Center, 2016, https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/
Resources. 
7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chairman’s Total Force Fitness Framework,” CJCSI 
Directive 3405.01. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 2011, A-1, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3405_01.pdf. 
8 “Popular DOD Resources,” Department of Defense, 2016, http://archive.defense.gov/resources/.  
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A. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Comprehensive Gang Model and TFF incorporate social and psychological 
dynamics that are applicable both to their intended audience and, potentially, to returning 
ex-foreign fighters. Through an exploration of these reintegration programs and the group 
members whom they are designed to serve, this thesis will explore the following research 
question: How can the United States develop an ex-foreign fighter reintegration strategy 
using the existing, analogous models of the Comprehensive Gang Model and TFF? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The U.S. government estimates that IS has successfully recruited foreign fighters 
from 120 countries.9 To place this figure in context, the United Nations comprises 193 
countries. The vast quantity of countries from which IS has been able to recruit 
individuals reveals that their message resonates with a diverse population of people and 
that there are likely multiple motivating factors causing people worldwide to travel and 
join IS, including the United States. IS is not the only group attracting foreign fighters—
especially individuals from the United States and other Western nations—to join the 
conflict in Syria and Iraq. The Islamic groups al Qaeda (AQ) and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, 
formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, have recruited even greater numbers of foreign 
fighters to further their causes.10 Foreign fighters engaged in the conflict in Syria and 
Iraq are not strictly limited to Islamic groups; Kurdish groups and Christian militias in the 
region are also successfully recruiting and utilizing Americans as foreign fighters. Thus, 
any strategy developed to assimilate, monitor, or otherwise engage returning ex-foreign 
fighters to the United States must transcend any explicit religion or ideology. 
Since 2006, the United States has relied on the National Strategy to Combat 
Terrorist Travel (NSCTT) to counter the most recent flow of foreign fighters. The 
NSCTT discusses the U.S. strategy in two sections, referred to within the report as 
                                                 
9 Horowitz, “ISIS Is Losing. Will That Make It More Dangerous?”  
10 Michael Jensen, Patrick James, and Herbert Tinsley, “Overview: Profiles of Individual 




“pillars.” Pillar 1 focuses on coordinated U.S. and international partnerships designed to 
constrain the ability of terrorists to travel.11 Pillar 2 focuses on restricting or denying 
terrorists the ability to enter, exit, and travel within the United States.12 The main 
limitation of the NSCTT is that it applies only to individuals classified as “known or 
suspected terrorists” and, thus, fails to account for persons motivated to travel to Syria or 
Iraq with no pre-existing relationship to a terror organization.13 Exacerbating this 
limitation, American and Western foreign fighters diverge from the traditional terrorist 
and foreign fighter profile: they are younger, there are more females, and as a result they 
are “less likely to be known by the authorities” than their predecessors.14 
Despite the existence of the 2006 NSCTT, the number of U.S. and Western 
persons traveling to Iraq and Syria to become foreign fighters continued to increase into 
2015, when the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee established a task force on 
Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel.15 The Final Report of the Task Force on 
Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel reported that as of October 2015, more 
than 250 Americans had traveled abroad to fight with Islamic State, and more than 85 
percent of aspiring American foreign fighters were able to travel abroad while evading 
law enforcement.16 The report also stated those traveling to join the conflict were both 
males and females, and concluded that these foreign fighters threaten the safety of the 
United States by “strengthening terrorist groups, inciting others back home to conduct 
attacks, or returning themselves to launch acts of terror.”17 The report concluded that the 
                                                 
11 National Counterterrorism Center, National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel, Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006, 1, https://fas.org/irp/threat/travel.pdf. 
12 Ibid., 3. 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 “The Profile of a Terrorist,” Koinonia House, February 16, 2015, https://www.khouse.org/
enews_article/2015/2360/print; Rachel Briggs Obe and Tanya Silverman, “Western Foreign Fighters: 
Innovations in Responding to the Threat,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014, 6, 
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2784_Western_foreign_fighters_V7_WEB.pdf. 
15 Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and 
Foreign Fighter Travel, 6.  
16 Ibid., 6–15.  
17 Ibid., 13. 
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United States failed to stop Americans from going abroad to become foreign fighters, and 
made 32 recommendations to stanch the flow.18 
Improved information sharing between the United States and Europe was the 
central theme of the report, as was the need for a central database of foreign fighter 
names and the prevention of evasive travel techniques.19 The report also cited the need 
for countering recruitment and radicalization through countering violent  
extremism (CVE) programs and other early intervention strategies.20 In addition, the 
United States adopted a criminalization strategy to address the threat of foreign fighters, 
from pre-travel to returning ex-foreign fighters.21 Title 18 U.S. Code § 2339B—
Providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization—is 
the primary charge, whereby the individual himself/herself is the material support.22 
France, the United Kingdom, and other Western nations have adopted similar strategies 
to stem the flow of foreign fighters, but none of these strategies has proven as successful 
as originally hoped.23 
The current strategies that the United States employs to mitigate an ever-growing 
foreign fighter issue are problematic for several reasons. The first is that NSCTT only 
addresses countering and limiting terrorist travel, while the Final Report of the Task 
Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel is focused on CVE, with 
specific focus on Islamic individuals. Finally, broad criminalization may “discourage the 
return of non-threatening foreign fighters, who may be invaluable intelligence sources or 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 6.  
19 Ibid., 4. 
20 Ibid., 6.  
21 A returned ex-foreign fighter is an individual who has disengaged and returned to his or her country 
of origin for the sole purpose of peacefully re-assimilating back into society and does not harbor any 
nefarious plans, whereas a returned foreign fighter is an individual who still identifies with their foreign 
fighter group and potentially still poses a threat. 
22 Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and 
Foreign Fighter Travel, 6. 
23 “Response to Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Recent Terrorist Attacks In Europe,” European Union, 
December 18, 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/.  
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tools for de-legitimizing terrorist organizations like al-Qaida and IS.”24 These strategies 
fail to address or consider the motivating factors behind the radicalization and subsequent 
travel abroad of the foreign fighter, or why the foreign fighter wants to return. 
James Comey, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has noted 
that many parallels could be drawn between Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s and the 
ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq, but that Syria and Iraq “offer an order of magnitude 
far worse in a couple of respects.”25 More foreign fighters have traveled to Syria and Iraq 
than Afghanistan, primarily because it is easier to get to Syria and Iraq than it was to 
travel to Afghanistan.26 From the foreign fighter diaspora that will eventually exit the 
conflict zone, Director Comey stated that the United States is “determined not to let lines 
be drawn from Syria [and Iraq] today to a future 9/11.”27 To mitigate the possible threat 
of returning U.S. ex-foreign fighters and to prevent another 9/11, this thesis explores 
opportunities to successfully reintegrate returning U.S. ex-foreign fighters back into the 
United States once U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials have determined that 
they are not an active threat, regardless of any remaining ideological or religious beliefs. 
The United States lacks a strategy for reintegrating ex-foreign fighters for several 
reasons. As of January 2016, U.S. intelligence estimated that only approximately 250 
Americans had traveled to join Islamic foreign fighter groups in Syria and Iraq, while at 
least 40 of them had returned to the United States.28 Out of the 40 who returned, only 
five were arrested by authorities upon their return.29 The arrest of returning ex-foreign 
fighters is challenging; many times it is difficult to link individuals to foreign fighter 
                                                 
24 Charles Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or Reintegration?,” Brookings 
Institution, 2015, 7, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/En-Fighters-Web.pdf.  
25 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Managing the Foreign Fighter Threat,” Brookings Institution, 




28 Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and 
Foreign Fighter Travel, 12 -23.  
29 Ibid. 
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groups and/or criminal activities without an informant or the assistance of foreign 
intelligence services.30 
Additionally, there is a difference of opinion on the actual threat that foreign 
fighters pose upon their return to their country of origin. Thomas Hegghammer writes 
that most jihadis in the West prefer to become foreign fighters rather than conduct attacks 
in their home countries because traveling abroad to fight in a foreign jihad conflict is seen 
within the foreign fighter community as more legitimate than conducting domestic 
attacks.31 Hegghammer believes that there are two main reasons why foreign jihad is 
believed to be more legitimate. First, many foreign fighters are motivated to become 
foreign fighters through propaganda videos geared toward foreign conflicts where they 
witness foreign fighters engaging in warfare to defend a precise population in conflict 
zones, such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.32 Second, not all Islamic clerics believe in 
attacking the West, “whereas almost no clerics question the legitimacy of geographically 
limited insurgency.”33 
On the contrary, U.S. counterterrorism officials believe that foreign fighters pose 
a clear and present threat to the United States, and U.S. security worldwide. They believe 
that all foreign fighters who do return to the United States will be more radicalized than 
when they departed, and now armed with paramilitary training they will be determined to 
continue their violent struggles.34 The FBI also believes that foreign fighters pose a 
security threat to the United States. During a hearing with the U.S. House Committee on 
Homeland Security, Assistant Director for the Federal Bureau of Investigation Michael 
                                                 
30 Timothy Holman, “Stuck in the Middle: Why Disrupting Foreign Fighter Mobilisations Is 
Difficult,” Across the Green Mountain, September 14, 2015, 
https://acrossthegreenmountain.wordpress.com/2015/09/14/stuck-in-the-middle-why-disrupting-foreign-
fighter-mobilisations-is-difficult/.  
31 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ 
Choice Between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 9. 
doi:10.1017/S0003055412000615 as cited in Timothy Holman, “Belgian and French Foreign Fighters in 
Iraq 2003–2005: A Comparative Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 8 (2015): 603–610.  
32 Ibid., 8–10. 
33 Ibid., 8.  
34 Brian Michael Jenkins, “When Jihadis Come Marching Home: The Terrorist Threat Posed By 
Westerners Returning From Syria And Iraq,” RAND Corporation, 2014, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE130-1/RAND_PE130-1.pdf. 
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Steinback stated that the FBI does not have American foreign fighters “under control.”35 
He further stated, “the [FBI] is doing the best [it] can. If I were to say that we had it under 
control, then I would say I know of every single individual traveling. I don’t. And I don’t 
know every person there and I don’t know everyone coming back. So it’s not even close 
to being under control.”36 Adding to the lack of reintegration strategy for ex-foreign 
fighters is that academic literature tends to focus on the early stages of their life-cycle, 
which consists of radicalization and recruitment. There is no rigorous framework 
exploring the final stages of the ex-foreign fighter life-cycle of disengagement, 
desistance, and reintegration. 
This research shows that there a variety of factors motivate a person to become a 
foreign fighter, most notably a shared common identity with a group of people that the 
foreign fighter perceives is facing an existential threat and that they feel they need to 
defend.37 Equally important, most foreign fighters who return to their country of origin 
do so not to conduct attacks.38 Therefore, there must be a strategy in place for U.S. 
foreign fighters abroad who decide that they no longer wish to be foreign fighters and 
sincerely want to reintegrate back into the United States, even if they still believe in the 
ideas and perceptions that originally motivated them to become foreign fighters. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The following sections will describe the overall strategy that I utilized to answer 
the previously stated research question. I start by detailing the three groups in this project, 
explaining why each group was selected. Then the limits of this project are explained, 
followed by a description of what type of data was utilized. I then explain the type of 
analysis that was used to examine the data, and finally detail the output of the research. 
                                                 
35 “FBI Warns of Intelligence Gap on Foreign Fighters in Syria, Iraq,” Federal Information & News 
Dispatch, February 11, 2015. http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/
1654737797?accountid=12702. 
36 Ibid. 
37 David Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 27 no. 3, 457 (2015):6, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2015.1032151. 
38Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?,” 10. 
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1. Sample and Sample Selection 
This research project studies the conceptual life-cycle of Islamic foreign fighters 
to ascertain the possibility of developing a reintegration strategy for returning U.S. 
foreign fighters by utilizing existing reintegration programs designed for ex-street gang 
members and formerly deployed military National Guard members. Data on the exact 
demographic group—U.S. citizens or residents who joined the conflict zone in Iraq or 
Syria to fight for IS, but who will return to the United States—is scarce. While we know 
approximately how many Americans have left the United States and joined IS, it is 
uncertain how many will return or in what mental or psychological condition they will 
arrive. As a result of this limitation, for information on the mindset, patterns, and issues 
surrounding returning foreign fighters, I looked at Islamic foreign fighters as a larger 
historical group, from Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq and Syria from 2003 to 2015. 
The sample was limited to Islamic foreign fighters because they have been the 
predominant foreign fighter population since the 1980s and constitute a majority of U.S. 
foreign fighters as of June 2016. 
I first identified characteristics of street gang members and formerly deployed 
National Guard members and compared them to Islamic foreign fighters to ascertain the 
similarities of street gangs and National Guard members with foreign fighters. All three 
groups are made up of mostly of adolescent males, who are part of groups where a shared 
common identity is a salient aspect, and all three groups use violence as a means to 
accomplish their objectives. These commonalities allowed for additional exploration of 
similarities among Islamic foreign fighters, street gang members, and formerly deployed 
National Guard members.39 I then delineated the conceptual life-cycle processes of street 
gang members and formerly deployed National Guard members, and conducted a 
comparative analysis with Islamic foreign fighters as a group, from radicalization and 
recruitment to traveling and engaging in conflict(s) to disengagement and reintegration 
                                                 
39 Adolescence is defined as “the years between the onset of puberty and the beginning of 
adulthood…[which] starts roughly between ages 12 and 13 and [traditionally] ends by age 20…[but] may 
well last into the late 20s,” University of Minnesota, “Growing and Developing,” and “Adolescence: 
Developing Independence and Identity,” in Introduction to Psychology, accessed September 30, 2016, 
http://open.lib.umn.edu/intropsyc/chapter/6-3-adolescence-developing-independence-and-identity/. 
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into society. Reintegration programs for ex-street gang members and formerly deployed 
National Guard members were analyzed for application to returning ex-foreign fighters 
based on the finding of the comparative analysis, which revealed the potential for 
leveraging the previously mentioned existing reintegration models to successfully 
reintegrate U.S. foreign fighters. 
Street gangs and formerly deployed National Guard members were selected 
because of their similarities to foreign fighters and because they have existing 
reintegration strategies. Street gangs exist in many nations, but the focus of this research 
project is reintegration of returned U.S. ex-foreign fighters. I therefore limited the 
comparative sample to U.S. street gang members and the U.S. street gang reintegration 
model. I chose the street gang model because the transnational groups that foreign 
fighters are being recruited to join are similar to street gangs in their familial and 
hierarchical structures. Both groups emphasize the social identity of their members, 
which makes it crucial to recruitment and retention. Both groups also view membership 
as a lifetime commitment, and therefore do not tolerate desertion. Street gangs and 
foreign fighter groups both accept and use violence as a tool to maintain order within the 
group and against their enemies. I hypothesize that leaving a transnational group or a 
street gang is equally difficult and that ex-members face similar challenges reintegrating 
into their original communities. 
The second comparative group is the U.S. military, specifically formerly deployed 
National Guard members. This group was selected because military members get 
deployed to distant conflict zones to engage in or support combat activities, similar to 
foreign fighters who self-deploy to foreign conflict zones, join a foreign fighter group, 
and engage in militaristic activities to support their group. As a result of being in a 
conflict zone, when formerly deployed National Guard members return home and start 
the reintegration process, some of them may encounter multiple challenges, including but 
not limited to, family relationship problems, and mental and physical health problems as 
a result of being in a conflict zone. For this research project, I am explicitly concerned 
with the mental health issues that some formerly deployed National Guard members may 
encounter. I hypothesize, based on the numerous reports and studies of the psychological 
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effects of war on some National Guard members returning from deployment, that some 
foreign fighters may suffer similar psychological effects while in a conflict zone. Mental 
health issues are already acknowledged as one factor affecting the successful 
reintegration of some formerly deployed National Guard members, and need to be part of 
any reintegration strategy designed for ex-foreign fighters. 
2. Limitations of this Research 
The primary limitation of this research project is the inability to test the findings. 
Another limitation of this research project is that it was designed for U.S. ex-foreign 
fighters who return to the United States and sincerely want to reintegrate back into 
society, regardless of any beliefs and ideas they may still possess. It is not designed as a 
process to reintegrate returning foreign fighters planning any criminal or terrorist activity 
in support of or as a member of a foreign fighter group. 
3. Data Sources 
The data for this study came exclusively from secondary sources. While I 
attempted to use academic journals for data on foreign fighters, I learned that there was 
little data available, I also had to use news reports, social media information, and blogs 
because they are the source of the most up-to-date information on foreign fighters. 
Precise information regarding exact cohorts of foreign fighters is limited and incomplete. 
There are three reports that do look at specific cohorts of foreign fighters: the 
first, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda, is based on interviews of 2,032 male foreign fighters 
who acknowledged association with al-Qaeda. The second report, which is derived from 
the Sinjar Records, is about foreign fighters who belonged to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
between August 2006 and August 2007 and then the Islamic State of Iraq, which was 
formed from the merger of AQI and other Iraqi insurgent groups.40 The last report titled 
The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter 
                                                 
40 The Sinjar Records are a group of documents that were recovered by Coalition forces in 2007 “in a 
raid near Sinjar, along Iraq’s Syrian border” as cited in Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter, “A First Look at 
the Sinjar Records,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007, 3, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/aqs-foreign-fighters-in-iraq.pdf; Stephen Negus, “Call for Sunni State in Iraq,” 
Financial Times, October 15, 2006, https://www.ft.com/content/e239159e-5c6a-11db-9e7e-0000779e2340.  
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Paper Trail, explicitly reviews Islamic State foreign fighters between early 2013 and late 
2014.41 While all three reports provided limited specific information regarding the 
cognitive aspects of joining a foreign fighter group, they did provide information on the 
most predominant foreign fighter groups of the 21st century. 
The data sources on street gangs came from secondary scholarly sources and the 
National Gang Center (NGC), which is supported by the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Bureau of Justice 
Assistance. The data on National Guard members came from secondary scholarly sources 
and from U.S. military documents and websites. All of the secondary sources are detailed 
and explored in depth in the literature review in Chapter II 
4. Type and Mode of Analysis 
This study applied the Constant Comparison method to compare the foreign 
fighter life-cycle to the life-cycle of street gang members and National Guard members’ 
post-deployment. The Constant Comparison method typically consists of four stages: “(1) 
comparing incidents applicable to each category (2) integrating categories and their 
properties (3) delimiting the theory, and (4) writing the theory.”42 According to Jane Dye 
in Constant Comparison Method: A Kaleidoscope of Data, “This method combines 
inductive category coding with a simultaneous comparison of all social incidents 
observed…[so] as social phenomena are recorded and classified, they are also compared 
across categories…thus [leading to] hypothesis generation (relationship discovery) 
[which] begins with the analysis of initial observations.”43 The dataset is “only coded 
enough to generate, hence, to suggest, theory.”44 The method “is concerned with 
                                                 
41 Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, “The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside 
Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 
2016, iv, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Caliphates-Global-Workforce1.pdf. 
42 Ibid., 439.  
43 Jane F. Dye et al., “Constant Comparison Method: A Kaleidoscope of Data,” The Qualitative 
Report 4 no. 1/2 (January 2000), http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR4-1/dye.html. Dye, Jane F., Irene M. 
Schatz, Brian A. Rosenberg, and Susanne T. Coleman 
44 Barney G. Glaser, “The Constant Comparative Method of Qualitative Analysis,” Social Problems 
12, no. 4 (Spring 1965):438, doi:10.2307/798843. 
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generating and plausibly suggesting (not provisionally testing) many properties and 
hypotheses about a general phenomenon, e.g., processes.”45 Therefore 
depending as it still does on the skills and sensitivities of the analyst, the 
constant comparison method is not designed (as methods of quantitative 
analysis are) to guarantee that two analysts working independently with 
the same data will achieve the same results; it is designed to allow, with 
discipline, for some of the vagueness and flexibility which aid the creative 
generation of theory.46 
The two independent control groups in this study are street gang members and 
formerly deployed National Guard members. I deconstructed the conceptual life-cycle of 
each group independent of the other into three categories—joining their group, 
supporting their group, and disengaging and desisting from the group—and reintegration. 
As Ian Dey writes in Qualitative Data Analysis, “categories must have two aspects, an 
internal aspect—they must be meaningful in relation to the data—and an external 
aspect— they must be meaningful in relation to the other categories.”47 
Then, using the deconstructed life-cycle parts of joining the group, experiences 
and activities in support of the group, and disengagement and desistance from the group 
as independent frameworks, the conceptual life-cycle of foreign fighters was mapped. 
Once the conceptual life-cycle of foreign fighters was mapped for comparative analysis, 
the primary reintegration strategy for each control group was analyzed using the 
framework from each control group respectively, to assess the applicability of using the 
existing reintegration models for foreign fighters. The working hypothesis was that 
individuals who are similarly categorized have the propensity to continue on comparable 
trajectories and therefore could be equally responsive to similar reintegration strategies. 
5. Output 
The output of this research project is two-fold. The first is a greater understanding 
of the conceptual life-cycle process(es) of foreign fighters. The second reveals an 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ian Dey, “Qualitative Data Analysis,” Classmatandread.com, 103, accessed February 7, 2016, 
http://www.classmatandread.net/class/785wk3/Qualitative_data_analysis.pdf . 
 14 
opportunity to leverage two existing reintegration strategies to reintegrate returning U.S. 
ex-foreign fighters, when the current strategy of criminalization is not most prudent. 
Successful reintegration of ex-foreign fighters strengthens the United States in 
multiple ways. The first is that it promotes a deeper relationship with the communities 
from which foreign fighters originate and eventually return, by making them part of the 
solution. Equally important is that reintegrated ex-foreign fighters could serve as 
keystones to the counter-narratives needed to prevent violent extremism and future 
foreign fighters.48 It also supports and possibly enhances the current strategies outlined in 
the 2006 NSCTT and the Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and 
Foreign Fighter Travel by allowing law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies 
to focus their resources on actual terrorists and individuals who pose a threat to the 
United States. Lastly, by offering a reintegration opportunity and establishing a positive 
relationship with a returned ex-foreign fighter, the homeland security enterprise may gain 
a clearer understanding of what motivates foreign fighter recruits to travel and join 
foreign fighter groups, enabling more targeted and effective counter-foreign fighter 
strategies. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, including this introduction. 
Chapter II consists of a literature review that explores variation in definitions of 
foreign fighters between the U.S. government and various academics. The literature 
review then covers the scope of the foreign fighter phenomenon, the role of identity in 
radicalization and recruitment of a foreign fighter, the threat of returning foreign fighters 
to the United States, and conceptual paths that foreign fighters take when they disengage 
from their foreign fighter groups. This section also details the current reintegration 
strategies for ex-gang members and formerly deployed National Guard members. 
                                                 
48 “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism,” 




Chapter III is a primer on social identity and the accepted use of violence by 
foreign fighter groups, street gangs, and the military. This section details the conceptual 
similarities of all three groups when viewed through the dual lenses of social identity and 
group-sanctioned violence. 
Chapter IV deconstructs the conceptual life-cycle of street gang members into 
three parts: joining the gang (group), supporting their gang, and disengaging and 
desisting from the gang. Using the deconstructed conceptual life-cycle of street gang 
members as a framework, the conceptual life-cycle of Islamic foreign fighters is detailed. 
Similarities are observed between group members in the cognitive process that members 
go through when joining and exiting their groups. 
Chapter V deconstructs the conceptual life-cycle of National Guard members: 
from joining the military to experiences and activities during combat deployment to 
detachment from the military. Using the deconstructed conceptual life-cycle of formerly 
deployed National Guard members as a framework, the conceptual life-cycle of Islamic 
foreign fighters is detailed. A comparison of members from both groups reveals that 
members have similar experiences and partake in similar activities while abroad. 
Chapter VI reviews the Comprehensive Gang Model and TFF reintegration 
programs. Then, based on the findings regarding the similar cognitive process that 
foreign fighters and street gang members progress through to join and depart their groups, 
and the findings regarding the similar experiences and activities that foreign fighters and 
National Guard members partake while deployed abroad, I structure a multidisciplinary 
reintegration model for returning ex-foreign fighters using components from the 
Comprehensive Gang Model and TFF. 
  
 16 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 17 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Existing research on foreign fighters is relatively new and jihad-centric. One 
reason, according to Thomas Hegghammer, is that of the 20 documented conflicts 
involving foreign fighters, only three conflicts, “Afghanistan in the 1980s, Iraq after 
2003, and Syria/Iraq after 2011, [have involved] more than 4,000 foreign fighters.”49 
Another reason is that the events of 9/11, perpetrated by al Qaeda—a group of foreign 
fighters who originally traveled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in 1980s—was a 
highly publicized event. David Malet explains that there is a common perception of most 
foreign fighters as Islamic jihadists, “because of their connection to the post-9/11 
international campaign against al Qaeda affiliates and later against the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria.”50 Lastly, because of the disparity in conflicts involving foreign fighters, 
there is no common definition. 
The following literature review, amid these limitations, examines the quantity of 
foreign fighters in the Middle East. Specifically, what constitutes a foreign fighter, the 
identity and radicalization of foreign fighters, historical perspective from previous 
mujahedeen and Iraq post-2003 foreign fighter cohorts after they disengaged from their 
respective conflicts, documentation on specific cohorts of foreign fighters, the U.S. street 
gang reintegration and National Guard post-deployment reintegration models, and the 
U.S. strategy for dealing with foreign fighters. 
A. THE SCOPE OF THE FOREIGN FIGHTER PROBLEM 
Literature estimating the total number of foreign fighters as of mid-2016 is 
relatively consistent as far as numbers are concerned. For the purpose of this study, the 
general consensus among intelligence reports and academics of several thousand foreign 
fighters will suffice. A 2015 U.S. Homeland Security Committee report, which bases its 
                                                 
49 Thomas Hegghammer. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and Globalization of Jihad,” 
International Security 35 no. 3 (Winter 2010/11): 60, as referenced in Daniel Byman, “The Homecomings: 
What Happens When Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
38, no. 8 (2015):583, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1031556.  
50 Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 454. 
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numbers on classified and unclassified U.S. intelligence reports, states that in 2013, when 
the number of foreign fighters traveling to the Middle East was steadily increasing, 
approximately 2,000 of the fighters were from Western nations.51 
Then in June 2014, after ISIS declared the caliphate, the number of foreign 
fighters exploded. Foreign fighters were reported to be flocking to the caliphate from an 
even greater number of countries than was reported in 2013, and U.S. officials estimate 
that the number of foreign fighters joining the conflict almost doubled.52 While the 
overall numbers of foreign fighters surged, so did the number of foreign fighters from 
Western nations, including approximately “3,000 with European or other Western 
passports…and as many as 100 with U.S. passports.”53 To place the number of foreign 
fighters into context, there were more Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq in 2014 
than there were in Afghanistan in the 1980s during their conflict with the Soviet Union or 
in Somalia following Ethiopia’s invasion.54 
B. DEFINING A FOREIGN FIGHTER 
The term “foreign fighter” is derived from the Afghanistan and Russian conflict 
of the 1980s. At the start of that conflict, Western governments were encouraging a jihad 
in Afghanistan. A “jihad,” as defined by the Islamic Supreme Council of America, is a 
concept that can be used to summon Muslims to protect fellow Muslims who are being 
attacked or persecuted for their belief.55 Western governments were therefore calling for 
Muslim men worldwide to travel to Afghanistan and fight the Russians, as a proxy 
                                                 
51 Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and 
Foreign Fighter Travel, 13. 
52 Ibid., 10. 
53 Brian Bennett and Richard A. Serrano, “More Western Fighters Joining Militants in Iraq and 
Syria,” Los Angeles Times, July 19, 2014, http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-80851081/. 
54 Jenkins, “When Jihadis Come Marching Home,” 15. 
55 “Jihad: A Misunderstood Concept from Islam—What Jihad Is, and Is Not,” Islamic Supreme 
Council of America, accessed March 2, 2016, http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-
rulings/5-jihad-a-misunderstood-concept-from-islam.html?start=9.  
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Western army.56 In late-1990s, al Qaeda altered the meaning of “jihad” by claiming that 
the United States was an enemy of Islam and declaring that all devout Muslims should 
attack the United States in any way they can, to defend fellow Muslims.57 The successful 
attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa and 9/11, solidified the new meaning of jihad.58 
The U.S. Congress, in its September 2015 Final Report of the Task Force on Combating 
Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel, defines foreign fighters as “individuals who leave 
home, travel abroad to terrorist safe havens, and join or assist violent extremist 
groups.”59 Similarly terrorist-focused, the U.S. military uses the term “foreign fighters in 
press releases to describe al Qaeda and allied terror groups from outside of Afghanistan” 
engaged in the combat zone.60 
Academics take a more functional view in classifying foreign fighters: Cerwyn 
Moore and Paul Tumelty, in a study of Chechnya, define foreign fighters as “non-
indigenous, non-territorialized combatants” inspired to join conflicts to defend and/or 
protect their religion, ideology and/or kinship, rather than being motivated by financial 
gain.61 David Malet defines foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states” who join 
insurgent groups to protect and/or defend a “transnational identity community” during 
civil conflicts.62 Ian Bryan, differentiating government agents from other citizens, 
describes foreign fighters as “not agents of foreign governments,” but rather foreigners 
who join armed conflicts to fight for a “transnational cause or identity.”63 Thomas 
                                                 
56 Afzal Ashraf, “Foreign Fighters: Foreign to Whom?” Al Jazeera, October 27, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/10/foreign-fighters-foreign-whom-
201410268380651831.html.  
57 Daniel L. Bynam, “Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets,” Brookings 
Institution, April 29, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-
goals-different-targets/.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and 
Foreign Fighter Travel, 8. 
60 Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 457. 
61 Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical 
Assessment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31no. 5 (2008): 421, doi: 10.1080/10576100801993347. 
62 Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 456.  
63 Ian Bryan, “Sovereignty and the Foreign Fighter Problem,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 54, 
no. 1 (2010): 120, doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.10.008. 
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Hegghammer simply defines a foreign fighter as “someone who leaves or tries to leave 
the West to fight somewhere else.”64 John Deni writes that “foreign fighter” is a 
designation assigned to non-native “individuals who choose to engage in insurgent 
military operations in foreign conflict zones without the promise of any financial 
remuneration.”65 Frank Cilluffo, Jeffrey Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp classify Western 
foreign fighters as violent Muslim extremists who travel to jihadi conflict areas with the 
goal of training and fighting against non-Muslim groups.66 John Venhaus defines a 
foreign fighter as “nonindigenous, nonterritorialized combatants who left the relative 
safety of home to participate in a conflict primarily against the United States and its 
allies.”67 This definition intentionally excludes all local fighters and fighters with ethno- 
nationalistic ties.68 
Barak Mendelsohn explains that not all foreign fighters are alike; he notes that 
“analysts often ignore the different levels of ‘foreignness.’”69 One example is in Somalia, 
where a majority of the foreign fighters actually come from Somali diaspora. According 
to Mendelsohn, “of the over 1,000 fighters with foreign passport fighting for Al Shabaab, 
only perhaps 200 to 300 were not of Somali heritage.”70 
The diversity of definitions reflects the variety of individuals who engage in 
foreign conflicts. A majority of the aforementioned scholars believes that to be classified 
a foreign fighter, the individual can be neither a citizen of nor indigenous to the area prior 
to the conflict. An example was in Iraq in 2003 when thousands of Iraqi diaspora returned 
to Iraq from Jordan to fight the United States. These returning Iraqi fighters are not 
                                                 
64 Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?,” 1. 
65 John R. Deni, “Beyond Information Sharing: NATO and the Foreign Fighter Threat,” Parameters 
45, no. 2 (2015): 49, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1711519128?accountid=12702.  
66 Frank Cilluffo, Jeffrey Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp, “Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories and 
Conflict Zones,” George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2010, 
https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:380558/FULLTEXT01.pdf.  
67 John M. Venhaus, “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, 3, 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Byman, “The Homecomings,” 583. 
70 Ibid., 584. 
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foreign fighters, rather individuals that are returning to defend their homeland. One 
returning Iraqi stated that he returned to Iraq to defend his country, “which has been 
occupied by invaders.”71 The actions of the individual must be related to some type of 
insurgency, whether a national civil conflict or in defense of transnational identity, such 
as religion, kinship and/or identity. For this study, these consensus parameters suffice: 1) 
non-citizen/non-indigenous and 2) join an insurgency. 
C. GROUP-SPECIFIC FOREIGN FIGHTER INFORMATION 
Literature regarding exact cohorts of foreign fighters is limited and incomplete. 
Three reports do focus on specific cohorts of foreign fighters: the first, Why Youth Join 
al-Qaeda, contains an analysis of interviews with 2,032 male foreign fighters who 
acknowledged association with al-Qaeda. The second report, A First Look at the Sinjar 
Records, examines foreign fighters who belonged to al-Qaeda in Iraq between August 
2006 and August 2007.72 The Sinjar Records were recovered “in a raid near Sinjar, along 
Iraq’s Syrian border.”73 The last report, titled The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An 
Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail, studies Islamic State 
foreign fighters between early 2013 and late 2014.74 An Islamic State defector smuggled 
out the documents, which were eventually turned over to the Combating Terrorism 
Center (CTC) at West Point for review, translation, and analysis. 
Why Youth Join al-Qaeda conducts an analysis of interviews with 2,032 male 
foreign fighters who “professed an association with al Qaeda or another global extremist 
movement whose objectives were not limited to local issues.”75 The author used 
interview transcripts from foreign fighters who had been captured by Coalition forces, in 
conjunction with information from the Sinjar Records and open-source information about 
                                                 
71 “Iraqi Diaspora Returns to Battle U.S. Forces,” Deutsche Welle, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/iraqi-
diaspora-returns-to-battle-us-forces/a-822289.  
72 Negus, “Call for Sunni State in Iraq.” 
73 Fishman and Felter, “A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” 3.  
74 Dodwell, Milton, and Rassler, “The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic 
State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail,” iv. 
75 Venhaus, “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” 4–34. 
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the detainees to complete the report.76 Of particular interest to this research project, the 
Sinjar Records reveal that the average age of foreign fighters entering Iraq was 24–25 
years old and that many “arrived with a group from their hometown, suggesting that al-
Qa’ida’s recruiters try to attract groups of friends simultaneously.”77 Also, a majority of 
fighters whose occupations were listed indicated that before traveling to Iraq, they were 
students, highlighting the role of social institutions like universities, in recruiting foreign 
fighters.78 
The report concludes that al-Qaeda foreign fighters “make a mental transition so 
that distant events seem so personal and so egregious that they are compelled to join 
someone else’s fight.”79 Al-Qaeda propagates a message that Islam is facing an 
existential threat from a monolithic enemy.80 Al-Qaeda presents itself as the vehicle for 
the umma, or community of the faithful, to take action and defend Islam, soliciting 
faithful Muslims to self-select and join their group.81 The report identifies four types of 
al-Qaeda recruits, which it refers to as “Seekers.” They are the Revenge Seeker, Status 
Seeker, Identity Seeker, and Thrill Seeker.82 The different types of Seekers show that 
individuals are motivated to become foreign fighters for different reasons. It could also 
mean that foreign fighters will leave their foreign fighter groups for different reasons, 
requiring a multifaceted reintegration strategy to support the possible various motives. 
In April 2016 the CTC produced a report titled The Caliphate’s Global 
Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail. The CTC 
analyzed “4,600 unique Islamic State personnel records that were produced by the group 
primarily between early 2013 and late 2014.”83 The IS records were provided to the CTC 
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by NBC News, which acquired the documents from an IS defector.84 Based on the 
recovered documents, the report concluded the following: foreign fighters from 70 
countries were represented, the level of skill and experience among them was very 
diverse, and the group represented in the documents appeared to be “well-educated 
compared to educational levels in their home countries.” Occupational skills on the other 
hand were primarily composed of lower-skilled positions, and that “approximately 10 
percent had previous jihad experience, primarily in Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan.”85 The 
report found that the average age of the foreign fighters, according to the recovered 
documents, was 26–27 years old, and revealed that 89 percent of Western foreign fighters 
had high school or post-high school, university or college education, compared with 76 
percent of the non-Western foreign fighters.86 
D. FOREIGN FIGHTER DISENGAGEMENT 
Literature is sparse regarding the path foreign fighters take after exiting their 
foreign fighter groups. According to Mohammed Hafez, some of the mujahideen that 
departed Afghanistan after withdrawal of the Soviet Union military returned to their 
countries to lead normal lives, and were revered as heroes.87 Other foreign fighters were 
used as soldiers by their government or traveled to other conflict zones. Some returned to 
their home countries and “posed significant dangers.”88 “In Saudi Arabia, those [foreign 
fighters] that had ‘retired’ after fighting in the 1990s in Afghanistan were later mobilized 
by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) when it began attacks in the Kingdom in 
2003.”89 Foreign fighters who traveled to Iraq post-2003 did not return home as heroes or 
to serve in their national military. Many foreign fighters died as a result of “fighting 
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American and other coalition forces on the ground, [or]…they were often used as suicide 
operatives.”90 
According to a report by the Brookings Institution, “some foreign fighters will 
become disillusioned by the conflict, its dynamics, or their individual experience, thereby 
deciding—often at considerable personal risk—to defect and head home.”91 A report 
issued by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence 
(ICSR), based on 58 IS foreign fighters who defected and spoke publicly about their 
membership within the group and defection, identified four narratives within the cohort 
that motivated them to defect. They were: infighting within the local Sunni Muslim 
population, brutality against (Sunni) Muslims within and outside of the IS, corruption and 
un-Islamic behaviors among commanders and leaders of the IS, and quality of life issues 
to do with living conditions within the proclaimed caliphate.92 The ICSR report 
recommends that nations acknowledge the reasons why defectors disengage from ISIS, 
and offer them opportunities to reintegrate back into society so they are comfortable to go 
public with the realities of being a foreign fighter.93 The Brookings Institution report 
states that receiving nations such as the United States should “require individual 
assessments in which motives for leaving and returning” are understood and explored.94 
E. EXISTING REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS 
Street gangs and the National Guard each have existing reintegration programs for 
those individuals that are/were members and want to successfully reintegrate back into 
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society. The following sections explore gang disengagement and reintegration and 
National Guard post-deployment reintegration. 
1. Gang Disengagement and Reintegration 
The literature regarding gang disengagement and reintegration is vast but 
consistent as to the various processes of gang member disengagement, which the 
literature refers to as “desistance.” Desistance can occur in two distinct manners: the gang 
member simply quits the gang abruptly or engages in a withdrawal process eventually 
ending in desistance.95 The manner in which gang members leave is important because it 
may affect their ability to successfully reintegrate back into society. According to Scott 
Decker, a leading academic in gangs, violence, and the offender’s perspective, gang 
members who abruptly quit may have an increased likelihood of successfully 
reintegrating back into society. Decker’s research indicates that ex-gang members who do 
not maintain contact or associate with any of their former gang members, eliminate the 
external pressure of returning to the gang.96 Gang members who gradually exit the gang 
may still maintain association with members of the gang, which may hinder their ability 
to completely disengage and successfully reintegrate back into society and not return to 
gang life.97 Because of the divergent ways in which gang members may disengage from 
their gang, successful desistance programs must account for the variance. 
The National Gang Center provides information for community organizations and 
law enforcement to prevent or reduce gang membership and/or activity and assist gang 
members in leaving their gang and reintegrating back into society. One strategy from the 
NGC is the Gang Intervention and Desistance strategy. The strategy is based on an 
understanding that individuals are attracted to and join gangs through a dual process of 
“push and pull.”98 The premise is that individuals are “pushed” to the join a gang through 
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negative social conditions such as “poverty, family problems, and lack of success in 
school.”99 Occurring relatively simultaneously is the “pull”—the perceived benefits that 
gang membership will provide the individual, such as “safety/protection, love and 
support, excitement, financial opportunities, and a sense of belonging.”100 
Working with the understanding that both processes contribute to the gang 
membership, the NGC studied the mechanisms that enabled individuals to leave gangs 
(desistance) and reintegrate into society. The NGC issued a bulletin that stated, based on 
their findings, that successful gang desistance required both push-and-pull factors.101 The 
report noted that the push factors “make persistence in that social environment [gang 
membership] unappealing, [the social conditions associated with gang membership] are 
viewed as ‘pushing’ the individual away from the gang.”102 Coupled with the push 
factors are the pull factors or “the circumstances or situations that attract [gang members] 
to alternative routes…toward new activities and pathways.”103 The NGC also noted that 
in addition to push-and-pull factors, the motivation of an individual gang member to 
leave his or her gang was related to how long the individual was an actual gang member, 
and how “established and severe the level of gang activity was in the community.”104 
Based on the finding of the NGC, the Comprehensive Gang Model is designed to 
address and support both the push-and-pull factors through five core strategies: 
community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and 
organizational change and development.105 The five strategies are designed to be used in 
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concert to address the previously mentioned push-and-pull factors that lead individuals to 
join gangs as well as aid gang members in disengaging from their gang. There are several 
other gang member reintegration programs based on the Comprehensive Gang Strategy, 
such as Homeboy Industries in Los Angeles, California,106 and Broader Urban 
Involvement & Leadership Development (BUILD) in Chicago, Illinois.107 
2. National Guard Post-deployment Reintegration 
Literature regarding military National Guard member post-deployment 
reintegration strategies acknowledges that formerly deployed National Guard members 
face various challenges during the reintegration at home, including employment and 
financial problems, family relationship difficulties, and the transition from military to 
civilian life while still a member of the National Guard.108 In addition, mental and 
physical health issues are also common challenges encountered by formerly deployed 
National Guard members.109 For this thesis, I am primarily concerned with the literature 
regarding the mental and physical health issues reported by formerly deployed National 
Guard members. All National Guard members are exposed to and experience various 
stressors while deployed. When these stressors exceed a certain threshold for some 
members, they may manifest as mental or physical health issues, which directly affect the 
ability of the National Guard member to smoothly reintegrate back into society.110 A 
2010 study titled “Prevalence of Mental Health Problems and Functional Impairment 
among Active Component and National Guard Soldiers 3 and 12 Months Following 
Combat in Iraq” found that between 23.2 percent and 31.1 percent of formerly deployed 
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service members, including National Guard members, reported a mental health 
problem.111 The literature also shows that mental health issues increase during the first 
several months after service members return from deployment.112 
As a result of both physical and emotional stressors, some formerly deployed 
National Guard members are diagnosed with traumatic brain injury (TBI), post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), and post-deployment multi-symptom disorder (PMD).113 TBI is 
diagnosed when an individual, or service member in this case, experiences “an external 
physical force that resulted in a traumatically induced structural injury to the brain or a 
physiological disruption of brain function, as indicated by medical findings or an acute 
loss of or alteration in consciousness.”114 PTSD is a “mental health condition that is 
triggered by a terrifying event—either experiencing it or witnessing it, where an 
individual experiences flashbacks, nightmares and severe anxiety, as well as 
uncontrollable thoughts about the event.”115 PMD, as its name suggests, is a multi-
symptom disorder “that includes, but is not limited to the following symptoms: sleep 
disturbance, low frustration tolerance/irritability, cognitive problems, fatigue, headaches, 
chronic pain, affective disturbance, apathy, personality change, substance misuse, 
psychosocial difficulties, and hypervigilance,” in addition to PTSD and TBI.116 
The rate and severity of the TBI, PTSD, or PMD diagnosis vary, as are the result 
of several factors directly associated with the service members’ level of combat 
engagement and/or their pre-deployment condition.117 Pre-deployment conditions could 
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be “neurogenetics, neurodevelopment, premorbid intellectual function, medical, 
neurological, psychiatric, and substance abuse conditions.”118 The reintegration process 
is complicated by these factors and by the psychological challenges of transitioning from 
living in a highly controlled conflict zone back to living in civilian society.119 Adding to 
these complications is the fact that approximately 800,000 service members have 
deployed more than once to Afghanistan and/or Iraq.120  
To address the increasing psychological issues observed in formerly deployed 
service members, to include National Guard members after Operation Enduring Freedom 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom, in addition to the normal challenges associated with 
reintegrating after a combat deployment, the Department of Defense (DOD) uses a Total 
Force Fitness (TFF) concept for their formerly deployed service member reintegration 
strategies.121 The TFF is a conceptual framework that uses a “four mind domain”: (1) 
psychological (2) behavioral (3) social, and (4) spiritual fitness.122 The DOD TFF 
framework is based on the belief that there is an interrelationship and interdependence of 
these domains. The DOD TFF reintegration strategy operates on the premise that to 
effectively address any single issue of a formerly deployed National Guard member, or 
any other formerly deployed service member, all four domains must be addressed and 
nurtured.123 The DOD TFF applies to all formerly deployed service members. This 
includes National Guard members who do not report any psychological or physical 
damage as well as members who do. 
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F.  CONCLUSION 
The literature shows that the number of foreign fighters in the Iraq/Syria region of 
the Middle East is large by anyone’s measurement. Adding to the concern for the United 
States is the reality that at least 250 Americans with U.S. passports may return to the 
United States with nefarious intentions.124 To counter the threat of foreign fighters, the 
United States had originally relied on the 2006 NSCTT, which primarily focused on 
limiting or prohibiting the travel of known or suspected terrorists.125 The 2016 U.S. 
strategy is based on four parts:  
1. Criminalize preparatory acts of terrorism. 
2. Continue to utilize law enforcement to address the threat of foreign 
fighters. 
3. Increase information sharing among nations regarding foreign fighter 
travel. 
4. Emphasize community engagement to prevent individuals from being 
radicalized and recruited to travel overseas to fight.126 
The literature does not contain evidence of programs that screen returning foreign 
fighters to determine their actual threat to the United States, and there does not appear to 
be any societal reintegration programs for returning ex-foreign fighters. The sole U.S. 
strategy is criminalization of returning foreign fighters. This could actually be stimulating 
foreign fighters to engage in terrorism or violent extremism, according to the findings of 
Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, who argue that criminalization is akin to a 
new post-9/11 “security environment… [where] the attendant security discourse helps 
feed the conspiratorial narrative that the war on terrorism is actually a war on Muslims,” 
which could fuel the radicalization or re-radicalization of returning ex-foreign fighters.127 
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The ICSR recommends that nations develop reintegration programs based on the 
motivating factors that caused the foreign fighter to defect, but it does not discuss how 
such a strategy should be implemented. The Brookings Institution report predicts that 
foreign fighters will eventually leave their groups, and urges nations including the United 
States to “require individual assessments in which motives for leaving and returning” are 
explored prior to allowing any returning ex-foreign fighters freely into the country.128 
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III. SOCIAL IDENTITY AND GROUP VIOLENCE 
The identity of group members and the social norms associated with that identity, 
specifically the acceptable use of violence in support of the group, are two areas that are 
deeply entrenched in the dynamics of foreign fighters, gang members, and National 
Guard members. The purpose of this chapter is to establish an initial framework by which 
to understand individual and group dynamics of group membership, and the mental 
process of accepting the social norms associated with specific group membership. 
A. SOCIAL IDENTITY 
Social identity is how an individual perceives that he or she relates or belongs to 
one social group more than another. It is based on the relationship between an individual 
and a group rather than any specific attribute.129 For example, nationality and ethnicity 
only possess meaning because they connect people socially.130 The different categories 
that American Muslims classify themselves demonstrate the polylithic nature of identity. 
According to a 2011 Pew Research report, American Muslims reported they belonged to 
different races, different socio-economic classes, different ethnicities, and even different 
political groups.131 
The process of self-identification is intuitive among all humans from early 
childhood, when children are exploring who they are and to what groups they belong.132 
The groups to which individuals perceive themselves as belonging, based on an identity, 
are that individual’s “in-group.”133 With the establishment of an in-group, there is also 
the establishment of a group with which the individual does not identify, the “out-group.” 
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An example is found in American Muslims; they identify all Americans as part of their 
national in-group, but when their in-group is framed through their religious identity, they 
only view fellow Muslims as their in-group, and anyone of a different religion, to include 
fellow Americans, as the out-group. 
As identity is a pluralistic concept, “individuals constantly engage in a process of 
self-evaluation redefining their identity and therefore their in-group [and outgroup].”134 
The process of constant evaluation of self-identity is also predicated on individuals 
searching for an identity that provides “a satisfactory concept or image of 
[themselves].”135 Identifying as a member of a group provides individuals with a sense of 
pride, self-esteem, and such perceived or actual benefits as “acceptance, belonging, and 
social support, as well as a system of roles, rules, norms, values, and beliefs to guide 
behavior.”136 An example is the Salat, the Muslim prayers performed five times daily. 
The Salat is over 1400 years old and serves as a universal ritual performed by all 
Muslims worldwide, regardless of nationality or ethnicity.137 Performing the Salat 
reinforces Islamic pride and Islamic commitment by all Muslims; it also connects living 
Muslims to Muslims that have died, by serving as an enduring ritual that all Muslims 
have performed throughout Islamic history.138 
Underpinning the motivation of people to travel from their country of residence to 
engage in a faraway conflict with a group of people they do not know, or know very 
distantly, is a shared salient identity with the group.139 Identity may take many forms, 
such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, or race.140 From this identity, individuals are 
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motivated to defend or support a group with whom they share a common identity.141 
Randy Borum and Robert Fein write that a shared salient identity is what differentiates 
foreign fighters from compatriots who do not go abroad to join a foreign fighter group. 
Borum and Fein also believe that loyalty, which is a “person’s sense of fidelity, 
commitment, or obligation to a broader community of people with whom he identifies” is 
at the root of foreign fighter motivations.142 
B. SOCIAL IDENTITY WITHIN FOREIGN FIGHTER GROUPS, STREET 
GANGS, AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 
Identity—and motivation—also contribute to the radicalization of the foreign 
fighters.143 According to Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “radicalization 
involves adapting an extremist worldview, one that is rejected by mainstream society and 
one that deems legitimate the use of violence.”144 Interestingly, Hafez and Mullins 
differentiate radicalization from violent extremism and terrorism, stating that “the former 
entails a cognitive dimension of adopting an extremist worldview that accepts the 
legitimacy of the use of violence…while the latter entails [an] additional behavioral 
dimension.”145 They believe a combination of factors influences whether radicalized 
foreign fighters adopt the behavioral aspect of terrorism or violent extremism, most 
prominently, “grievances, networks [between individuals with] preexisting kinship and 
friendship ties, ideologies regarding an individual’s identity and their place in the world, 
and possessing enabling environments and support structures…to deepen their 
commitment to radical milieus.”146 
For contemporary foreign fighters, religion has been the salient identity that has 
motivated individuals to depart their countries of origin and travel to distant conflict areas 
to fight for and defend their in-group. Transnational foreign fighter recruitment is based 
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on “duty and defense…of an ideological faction.”147 Foreign fighters join their groups 
and engage in activities with the purpose of defending their group from an existential 
threat.148 Both diaspora Muslims and Christians have traveled to the ongoing conflict in 
Syria and Iraq to support and defend their in-group. 
The dynamic has formed a regular part of recent conflicts, particularly in Muslim 
regions of the world. From the mujahedeen in Afghanistan to the Sunni Islamist foreign 
fighter groups in Syria and Iraq, “Islamic fundamentalists claim their calls for jihad [of 
foreign fighters] are in defense of the transnational Islamic community.”149 More than 50 
years ago, James N. Rosenau, former professor of International Affairs at the George 
Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, proposed that foreign 
fighters were mostly likely to be attracted to foreign conflicts that were framed as a 
“global struggle over deeper identity-based issues.”150 
Street gangs are also built on a salient identity. Some gangs are based on ethnic 
identity, others on nationality, and others on location. There are occasions when the 
gang’s identity is based on a combination of two identities, and the salient identity is 
based on the situation. An example is the Bloods, gangs that operate primarily on the 
West and East Coasts, with small groups scattered throughout the United States. Within 
the Bloods gang there are two subgroups: the West Coast Bloods and the United Blood 
Nation (East Coast Bloods). When a Bloods gang member has an issue with an outside 
gang, the salient identity of the individual and all other members of the collective Bloods 
group are as Bloods members. But when internal issues arise within the Bloods gang and 
it is between a West Coast Blood member and a United Blood Nation member, the salient 
identity of the individual gang members change to whichever subgroup they belong, 
West Coast Blood member or United Blood Nation member.151 This shows the multiple 
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identities gang members possess, and that the context of the situation dictates which 
identity is most important. 
For National Guard members, nationality is the salient identity associated with 
membership. All U.S. service members formally swear an oath to defend the United 
States from all enemies, and to obey the president and any other officer appointed over 
them. Within the U.S. Armed Forces, there are five separate subgroups: Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. Each subgroup has its own customs, norms, and codes 
of conduct, in addition to the overarching rules and regulations established by the 
Department of Defense for all military personnel. During combat, these subgroups 
operate as a single United States military unit, taking command from a single Unified 
Combatant Command.152 
Threats from an out-group may take two forms according to Intergroup Threat 
Theory, which posits that the threats to an in-group may be real or symbolic.153 Real 
threats are threats that could negatively affect the group’s safety, security, and/or 
resources.154 Symbolic threats, on the other hand, are threats to the groups “morality, 
philosophy, ideology, belief system, values, religion or its worldview.”155 Within the 
framework of intergroup threat theory, it is the actions of the out-group that the in-group 
perceives as a threat, rather than any action the in-group initiated.156 When the in-group 
is responding to the actions of the out-group, this establishes a defensive position to the 
in-group, which facilitates a narrative that includes the justified use of violence to defend 
the group and enable its survival. 
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C. VIOLENCE AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
Defensive violence transcends all three groups in this research project. Utilizing 
the radicalization framework established by Mohammed Hafez, we show that individuals 
from all three groups go through a similar process of socialization to use or accept the use 
of violence by fellow group members. Hafez identifies three main elements that reveal 
the underlying psychological process individuals go through. “Radicalization is a (1) 
gradual ‘process’ that entails socialization into an (2) extremist belief system that sets the 
stage for (3) violence even if it does not make it inevitable.”157 
The difference among the three groups in this study is the qualification of what 
constitutes extremist beliefs and the justification of violence. Cognitively, extremist 
beliefs are defined as those that are “far removed from the ordinary.”158 This definition 
delineates extreme from ordinary, where ordinary represents the mainstream socially 
accepted belief within a given society or social setting. While military service is socially 
acceptable, and foreign fighter membership and gang membership are considered deviant 
to the broader community, the process that individual members go through as part of all 
three groups, specifically in regards to using violence as an acceptable form of defense is 
very similar. The Soufan Group observed that the Islamic State, the greatest recipient of 
the current foreign fighter movement, offers foreign fighters acceptance as long as they 
adhere to a “narrow set of rules, [which are] strictly enforced,” based on the Islamic 
State’s interpretation of religion, and “uniformly applied,” regardless of the opinion of 
the foreign fighter.159 
This same dynamic is observed in street gang members. University of California 
Irvine professor James Vigil observes, for example, that for potential gang members “to 
gain acceptance from peers, an individual will adapt behavioral patterns that initially 
have little intrinsic meaning to him, and perhaps might even be repugnant, but 
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nevertheless are requisites for gang membership.”160 In the military, all service members 
go through an initial recruit training once they join, colloquially referred to as boot camp. 
During initial training “new recruits are immersed in an extensive boot-camp program, in 
which their civilian status is broken down and the new identity of military recruit is 
forged,” with all associated accepted norms of behavior.161 
Individual and group dynamics reside at the core of all group interactions: gang 
interactions with those outside of the gang (out-group), national militaries with foreign 
entities (out-group), and foreign fighter groups with those outside of their collective 
group (out-groups). When the in-group perceives a threat from an out-group, even when 
the perceived threat is irrational, the sense of belonging intensifies within the in-group, 
while prejudices and negative feelings regarding the out-group also intensify.162 The 
negative feelings and prejudices can “heighten cognitive biases that distort” the actions 
and perceptions of the out-group, which in many cases inevitably leads to violence 
between the groups.163 
A majority of Islamic foreign fighter groups frame their actions as fighting a 
defensive battle, and that devout Muslims should “sacrifice their individual interests for 
the needs of the [Muslim] community.”164 Recruiters initiate the radicalization process 
by stressing that their in-group will “suffer even greater costs with inactivity.”165 
Recruiters frame the threat to the in-group as “an existential threat, requiring emergency 
measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure,” 
normally in the form of violence.166 
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The process of socialization into a group that may call for violence, even if it is 
not inevitable, is also found in gang and military recruitment. In gangs, new members are 
indoctrinated to “internalize and adhere to alternative norms and modes of behavior [if 
they want to achieve] a sense of importance, self-esteem, and identity, [with the most 
important aspect] to attain status is to develop a reputation for being violent.”167 Even 
within the military, where conducting violence to defend the nation is generally accepted, 
service members must be indoctrinated because it is not innate. 
Retired Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall interviewed service members upon 
their return after World War II and found that “even battle-hardened veterans of elite 
units—even in the most desperate straits—rarely shot directly at the enemy.”168 He 
summarized that the service members “come from a civilization in which aggression, 
connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable.”169 Initial military 
recruit training serves to indoctrinate and operationalize service members to use violence 
as a necessary component of individual defense and the defense of the nation. Many 
exercises during initial recruit training revolve around violence. “Violence directed at 
[recruits] was merged with the learning how to do violence … [because learning to be 
violent] meant learning how to protect their lives,” and the lives of their fellow service 
members.170 
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IV. U.S. STREET GANG COMPARISON 
The conceptual life-cycle of street gang members can be broken down into three 
parts: joining the gang/group, supporting the gang/group; and disengaging and desisting 
from the gang/group. In this chapter, the gang member life-cycle framework is applied to 
Islamist foreign fighters. 
U.S. street gangs are located throughout the country and have very diverse names, 
slogans, and identities. A street gang can be defined as a group of “three or more 
individuals,” who share a common identity, and whose purpose, in part, is to “use 
violence or intimidation to engage and further its criminal activity and objectives.”171 All 
gangs have an identity traditionally reflected in their name, and all gangs serve a purpose 
to their members, whether it is for familial bonding or material gain.172 The crime and 
violence that street gangs conduct are to “enhance or preserve the association’s power, 
reputation, or economic resources.”173 Drug dealing and theft are some of the acceptable 
criminal behaviors allowed within street gangs. 
Street gang disengagement and desistance programs have been successful at 
supporting gang members when they start to doubt their membership in the gang, by 
providing opportunities to exit the gang and transition to productive members of 
society.174 The role of social identity and role transition in disengagement and desistance 
is critical. A disengaged street gang member, who still harbors a positive social identity 
as a gang member, may feel compelled to re-join or to take action to support the gang if 
he or she perceives that the former gang is being threatened.175 The process of 
cognitively exiting the gang involves role transition from self-identifying as a gang 
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member to an ex-gang member with a positive self-view in their new role as an ex-gang 
member.176 
A. CONCEPTUAL LIFE-CYCLE 
The following sections will explore the conceptual life-cycle of gang members 
and foreign fighters, which will show the similar paths that gang members and foreign 
fighters cognitively move along to join their group and then exit their group. Within this 
section the conceptual life-cycle process is broken into three parts: joining the group, 
supporting the group, and disengaging and desisting from the group. For each part of the 
life-cycle, the process that gang members progress through is detailed first and used as 
the framework to explore the process that foreign fighters progress. 
1. Joining the Group 
The actual process of joining a street gang is varied but marked by three distinct 
dynamics: interest in the gang, contact with members of the gang, and a willingness to 
engage in violence.177 The process is neither linear nor limited to a single occurrence; 
still, these factors are important for effective disengagement and desistance programs. A 
gang member may proceed through the entire process of joining with one gang, or he or 
she may go through parts of the process and stop, only to repeat parts of the process with 
the same gang or go through the entire process with another gang. 
Intertwined in this process are several “pull” and “push” factors that lead 
prospective members to join gangs.178 Pull factors are seen by the individual as positive 
benefits to membership, while push factors are perceived negative conditions or forces 
that push the individual toward gang membership for the perceived benefit. A 
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combination of the previously mentioned factors serves as the catalyst(s) for an 
individual to become a U.S. street gang member.179 
Primary pull factors on gang member recruits are: 
• to enhance their identity and/or social status, 
• to fulfill a need for excitement, and/or 
• to improve their economic situation through the ability to engage in drug/
narcotic trafficking and other crime.180 
 
Primary push factors on gang member recruits are: 
• for personal protection, 
• to achieve a familial relationship, and/or 
• to achieve a sense of belonging/identity.181 
 
As with prospective gang members, intertwined within the process of joining a 
group/gang are both pull and push factors for foreign fighter recruits.182 The report on 
Why Youth Join al Qaeda identified that all foreign fighters were “looking for 
something,” which suggests five motivational reasons for foreign fighter recruits to 
become foreign fighters. These are directly correlated to the previously referenced gang 
member pull and push factors: seeking revenge, status, identity, thrills, or tangible 
benefit.183 
The five motivational factors described by Venhaus can be split into pull and push 
categories. The status seeker, thrill seeker, and tangible benefit seeker are all motivated 
by pull factors, whereas the revenge seeker and identity seeker are motivated by push 
factors. According to Venhaus, the foreign fighter revenge seeker is an individual looking 
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to right a perceived wrong.184 These foreign fighters “often showed signs of an inflated 
sense of self-worth.”185 The foreign fighter identity seeker, which was most represented 
in the foreign fighter group, is searching for a group that satisfies a salient identity that 
he/she perceives.186 “The motivation to define oneself by the group identity … is almost 
universal among developing adolescents … [and is one of the factors] that draws young 
people to [foreign fighter groups and] street gangs.”187 Foreign fighter status seekers 
perceive that they do not assimilate into society because of their identity.188 The status 
seeker was mostly found in the Muslim diaspora, especially in the West.189 The foreign 
fighter thrill seeker is an individual who is motivated to experience and survive 
adventures.190 The foreign fighter tangible benefit seeker is looking for personal tangible 
benefits in the form of money, goods, food, and/or having their debts paid.191 An 
important note about receiving financial benefit from becoming a foreign fighter is that 
“recruiters typically explicitly inform [foreign fighters] prior to their enlistment that their 
services will bring minimal, nonguaranteed payments, often in a nonconvertible 
currency.”192 
In addition to similar motivating pull and push factors, the cognitive process that 
foreign fighter prospects go through to join their respective groups is very similar to that 
of gang members, revealing that the reasons foreign fighters join their groups is not 
unique. Prior to joining foreign fighter groups, foreign fighter prospects explore potential 
groups in two main ways: through personal contact with a member, associate, or 
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disseminator/recruiter; or through the Internet.193 A majority of foreign fighter prospects 
self-initiate the process of becoming a foreign fighter rather than being recruited or 
coerced.194 The proliferation of the Internet coupled with the explosion of social media 
has enabled foreign fighter prospects to conduct their own research into potential foreign 
fighter groups in privacy and from anywhere in the world. For U.S. foreign fighters, the 
Internet was central to their eventual decision to become a foreign fighter.195 Foreign 
fighter groups like Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, fully aware that potential 
recruits are using the Internet to conduct their own inquiries into the group, have created 
a robust presence on various social media platforms to attract foreign fighter prospects. 
The foreign fighter groups use “propaganda aimed at multiple audiences, including 
references to Western popular culture,” to attract Western foreign fighter prospects.196 
Traditional social networks such as family and friends help facilitate recruitment 
by emphasizing the benefits of membership.197 Documents discovered pertaining to 
foreign fighters in Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion indicate that the “overwhelming 
majority of [foreign fighters] made the journey in small groups (at least two).”198 The 
Sinjar Records also reveal that foreign fighter prospects joined the conflict in groups 
rather than individually: “Of the 202 fighters that recorded their date of arrival in Iraq, 
46.5 percent (94) of them arrived on the same day as another individual from their 
hometown.”199 The records do not explicitly state how they were recruited, but one can 
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reasonably deduce that the foreign fighter prospects traveled together and were most 
likely recruited together or at least by the same individual. 
Based on the previously referenced motivational push-and-pull factors of gang 
members and foreign fighters, the similarities between the two groups are shown in Tables 
1 and 2. 
Table 1.   Pull Factors between Gang Members and Foreign Fighters200 
Gang Members Foreign Fighters 
Enhance identity / social status Status seeker 
Need for excitement Thrill seeker 
Improve economic situation Tangible benefit seeker 
Table 2.   Push Factors between Gang Members and Foreign Fighters201 
Gang Members Foreign Fighters 
Protection Revenge Seeker 
Familial relationship Identity Seeker 
Sense of belonging / identity Identity Seeker 
 
Once an individual becomes a member of his or her respective group, he or she 
engages in various activities in support of the group. The following section details those 
activities that gang members and foreign fighters engage in, which shows that the goal of 
each group contain both similarities and differences. 
2. Activity in Support of Group 
Once an individual joins a gang, he or she derives a new social identity and, 
among other perceived benefits, social capital from membership.202 Social capital for 
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gang members is considered “the sum of one’s relationships and social spheres” as a 
result of becoming a gang member.203 The gang member now has power and access as a 
result of their membership. Gang members’ conception of their social role and what 
social activities are permitted and/or expected is primarily based on their membership 
within the gang.204  
Within street gangs, there are three basic hierarchical roles. The three gang roles 
can be broken further into core and peripheral members.205 The highest title/role in the 
gang is the “OG” or original gangster. This title/role denotes a core veteran member of 
the gang, and someone who has shown dedication and commitment to the gang.206 The 
OGs are formal and informal leaders within the gang and determine what level of 
criminal activity the gang will engage in.207 Below OGs are “Gs” or gangsters, who are 
the general members of the group, and also considered core members. The Gs are 
primarily responsible for coordinating acts of violence directed at those outside the 
gang.208 Then the gang has “wannabees,” who are individuals who desire to be Gs. The 
“wannabees” are not actual members but sometimes are the most dangerous because they 
are trying to show the OGs and Gs that they are worthy of membership into the gang.209 
“Wannabees” constitute peripheral members; while they conduct activities to support the 
gang, they have no real standing within the gang.210 
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The typical activity of street gangs is crime. “Typical gang-related crimes include 
drug trafficking, alien smuggling, armed robbery, assault, auto theft, extortion, fraud, 
home invasions, identity theft, murder and weapons trafficking.”211 Gang members 
engage in these activities for two primary reasons: to improve the financial standing of 
the gang and to defend or acquire territory to conduct the aforementioned activities.212 
For foreign fighters, their general activities are similar to street gang members but 
the roles foreign fighters are assigned differ from street gangs based on the goals of 
foreign fighter groups. Foreign fighter groups aim to improve their financial standing so 
they can continue to defend/acquire territory, similar to street gangs. Unlike street gangs 
that have three basic hierarchal roles, Islamic foreign fighter groups have four functional 
roles: Direct Action, Operational Support, Movement Support, and Logistical Support, 
based on the goals of the foreign fighter group.213 “Direct Action” is direct participation 
in combat and/or fighting, while “Operational Support” describes all activities that are 
conducted to support direct action and may include identification and planning of targets 
and preparation of weapons and explosives.214 “Movement Support” involves recruiting, 
financial management, and internal and external communications, and “Logistical 
Support” includes the acquisition and distribution of food, money, supplies.215 Street 
gangs roles are based on an individuals’ status within the group and based on that status, 
one can dictate group activities to members in subordinate roles.216 
In Islamic foreign fighter groups, the roles are delineated more on function than 
status, because based on the goal(s) of the foreign fighter group there are multiple priorities 
to simultaneously manage. An example is in IS, where the group must identify targets, pay 
salaries, make and distribute propaganda videos, and support international travel, in 
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addition to purchase and distribute weapons, ammunition, and vehicles.217 Because the 
goal of IS is to establish a caliphate in the areas in and around Syria and Iraq, it has 
assigned its foreign fighters various roles from internal security to sanitation worker.218 IS 
even actively recruits for the myriad roles it has to fill. An example comes from an IS 
recruitment video targeting Westerners, recorded by a Canadian citizen who had joined: 
You know, there’s a role for everybody. Every person can contribute 
something to the Islamic State. It’s obligatory on us. If you cannot fight, 
then you give money, if you cannot give money then you can assist in 
technology, and if you can’t assist in technology you can use some other 
skills…We can use you. You’ll be very well taken care of here. Your 
families will live here in safety just like how it is back home. You know, 
we have wide expansive territory here in Syria and we can easily find 
accommodations for you and your families. My brothers, there is a role for 
everybody here in Syria…come join before the doors close.219 
3. Disengagement and Desistance from Group 
Disengagement and desistance has consistently been documented as a four-step 
process that begins with contemplation of gang membership. Berger, Abu-Raiya, 
Heineberg, and Zimbardo believe that a triggering event initiates the disengagement 
process.220 They define a triggering event as a significant negative event or a “positive 
event that presented a challenge to the epistemic worldview of the gang member.”221 
Violence was the predominant factor cited by ex-gang members as the reason for 
disengaging from the gang: “There is an upper limit to gang violence and the tolerance 
that individual gang members have for that violence.”222 
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Most other desistance studies indicate that there is a series of motivating factors 
that gradually or abruptly lead gang members to start the process of disengaging from 
their gang.223 The longer a gang member remains in the gang, the more disconnected he 
or she becomes from mainstream society. This disconnect increases the cost of gang 
membership because less connection to mainstream society results in the gang member 
becoming more involved in drug-related crime and violence; they do not go to school or 
work, which starts to worsen the social conditions that the gang member experiences. 
This cumulative buildup of negative experiences eventually reaches a tipping point where 
the gang member gets disillusioned with their membership within the gang, which 
initiates the process of exiting the gang.224 
During the first phase of gang desistance, negative experiences build up for the 
gang members, as was previously referenced, causing the gang member to start the 
cognitive process of evaluating the cost of gang membership to him or herself.225 After 
acknowledging that the cost of membership outweighs the benefits, the gang member 
starts to assess the legitimacy of the gang, his or her relationships, or lack thereof with his 
or her pre-gang family, and the cost of violence to the individual as a member of a 
gang.226 
The next phase in the gang desistance process for gang members is an evaluation 
and exploration of alternate roles outside of the gang. The process of exploration can be 
mental or physical, with the gang members experimenting with new social roles outside 
of the gang. The gang members, depending on how disconnected they were from 
mainstream society, may want to experiment with new social roles prior to actually 
leaving the gang. Their main contemplation within this phase is whether the new role will 
be more positive for them than their current situation in the gang.227 This phase is only 
limited by the opportunities available to the gang member outside of the gang. The more 
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opportunities available to the gang member, the more the gang member can mentally and 
physically explore and evaluate the positives and negatives of leaving the gang for a new 
role in society. According to Decker, Pyrooz, and Moule, once a gang member identifies 
a new group and role to which he or she aspires, he or she engages in the cognitive 
process of “anticipatory socialization,” where the gang member is looking forward to 
their new role and “severing ties to [their] old roles.”228 
Following evaluation and exploration is physical disengagement or exiting from 
the gang. During this phase, the gang member physically separates from their gang. “This 
stage is varied in terms of style, duration, and finality.”229 Gang members leave their 
gangs one of two ways. The first way is an abrupt exit, also known as “knifing-off,” a 
sudden, complete cessation of interaction or association with the gang.230 Being a victim 
of violence was the predominant factor cited by gang members for them knifing-off from 
their gang.231 One gang member stated that shortly after she was in a fight with a girl that 
pulled a knife on her, her fellow gang member was shot, and that she knew instantly that 
she did not want to be a gang member any longer.232 The other manner to exit the gang is 
through a gradual process. Gradual separation can take many forms, and is usually 
dependent on the person’s role or rank within the gang, the violence level within the 
gang, and “most importantly the level of support the gang member has external to the 
gang.”233 One ex-gang member, who was an OG of his gang, stated that after the leader 
of his gang was arrested and convicted for gang-related activities, that he had second 
thoughts about staying in the gang. The gang member would go back and forth from “one 
day [he] quit [the gang], the next day [he] would [conduct gang member activities such as 
drug dealing, shootings, etc.].”234 What eventually enabled this ex-gang member to 
completely disengage his gang was returning to his childhood church. The church helped 
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him “realize [he] needed to change up and give back to the community.”235 The support 
the ex-gang member received outside the gang helped him achieve desistance. 
Members who are more central to the leadership of the gang have a more difficult 
time leaving the gang. Their social network is mostly made up of fellow gang members, 
many of whom are also close to the leadership of the gang, so there is a lot of peer 
pressure to stay in the gang and presumably very little pull on the gang member from 
outside the gang. (In contrast, gang members on the periphery still have friends and 
acquaintances who are not involved with the gang and serve as pulls on the gang 
members in addition to providing them the social support necessary to exit the gang.) 
External support has been cited by a majority of gang members as a key factor in their 
disengagement because no matter what a gang member’s position is within the gang, 
there is pressure from within the gang to maintain their membership.236 External support 
has been credited with providing “countervailing pressures to remain in the gang,” so the 
more external support the gang member has, the greater their ability to exit the gang.237 
Familial relationships, employment, girlfriend/boyfriend relationships, school, church, 
and even the criminal justice system can serve as the external support necessary for a 
gang member to disengage from the gang.238 
The final phase of gang desistance is when the ex-gang member assumes a new 
social identity. This coincides with what Decker, Pyrooz, and Moule call “post-exit 
validation.”239 Post-exit validation is the cognitive process of a gang member adopting a 
new identity as an ex-gang member, which is then reaffirmed through an external source 
such as a family member, community member, or a new friend.240 In this phase, ex-gang 
members successful at maintaining gang desistance find “new supportive groups that are 
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unconditionally willing to accept them [and their new identity].”241 Post-exit validation is 
especially important from law enforcement, because an ex-gang member who has 
negative experiences with law enforcement, based primarily on their previous identity as 
a gang member, may be pushed back into the gang.242 The gang members may perceive 
that if they are always going to be treated like a gang member, whether they are one or 
not, they might as well be one. 
 Many times gang disengagement is a back-and-forth process before complete 
gang desistance is achieved.243 Gang disengagement and desistance is a non-linear 
process of cognitively transitioning from identifying as a gang member to an ex-gang 
member. The process normally starts as a mental exploration of what other better 
opportunities are available to the gang member outside of the gang. Once the gang 
member considers a more positive role outside the gang, the member physically 
disengages from the gang to assume his or her new identity. Between disengagement and 
desistance, the gang member undertakes a new identity as an ex-gang member, which he 
or she wants validated by people inside and outside of the gang. Without validation as an 
ex-gang member, there is a greater likelihood that the ex-gang member may get pulled 
back into the gang.244 Once an ex-gang member gets pulled back into the gang, he or she 
may fully re-commit to the gang, or they may begin the process of exiting the gang 
almost immediately.245 
Ex-foreign fighters, like ex-gang members, have pointed to push-and-pull factors 
motivating their exit/departure.246 The most common push factors as reported in the 
ICSR report are violence and quality of life issues.247 Ex-foreign fighters did not like that 
the IS committed brutal violence against fellow Sunni Muslims, the same people they 
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were supposed to be protecting. This led the ex-foreign fighters to fear that they too 
might be the victims of brutal violence at the hands of the IS. Some quality of life issues 
were also related to violence, with some ex-foreign fighters complaining that foreign 
fighters were “exploited and used as cannon fodder.”248 Other quality of life issues 
pertained to “shortages of electricity and basic goods.”249 The most common pull factor 
cited is disillusionment, after witnessing infighting, corruption, and un-Islamic 
behaviors.250 Ex-foreign fighters believed that the infighting between the various Sunni 
Muslim groups was religiously illegitimate, since they thought the goal of all the groups 
were to defend Sunni Muslims from the atrocities committed against them by the Syrian 
government.251 
The process of foreign fighters questioning membership is directly linked to 
possible alternative roles outside of their foreign fighter group. A majority of the ex-
foreign fighters in the ICSR report stated that the reason they became foreign fighters was 
to protect fellow Muslims, and specifically Sunni Muslims, from “apostates” and 
“infidels.”252 For foreign fighters to leave their group, they must be sure that the group 
“does not represent the ‘true faith,’ and that defecting does not equal leaving Islam.”253 
While the foreign fighter goes through mental contemplation of exiting or 
maintaining membership within the foreign fighter group, he or she also is evaluating the 
physical prospects of exiting the group. Foreign fighters’ exploration of roles outside of 
the foreign fighter group extends beyond just exiting the group, to include where they 
will live, what they will do for employment, and what their social network will be like. 
Exiting the group and returning to one’s original country of residence is only one of 
several pathways foreign fighters take. They may also become “government assets, 
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foreign fighter facilitators, engage in social revolutionaries in their home countries, 
become global jihadists, or unaffiliated terrorists.”254 
Foreign fighters understand that most of their resident governments are “likely to 
see them as ‘sleepers’ or ‘dangerous returnees.’”255 This reality severely limits the ability 
of many foreign fighters to reasonably contemplate or explore roles outside of their 
group. In addition, as of July 2016, many governments will not let the foreign fighter 
back into their home country or will arrest them upon their return, and “practically 
everyone who is known to have returned faces legal proceedings and lengthy prison 
sentences.”256 The blanket criminalization of ex-foreign fighters limits their options 
when they contemplate leaving their foreign fighter group and desire to return to their 
country of origin to peacefully reintegrate back into society. The lack of formal 
reintegration opportunities may be keeping foreign fighters in the conflict zone rather 
than having them depart, skewing the data on how many foreign fighters actually leave 
their foreign fighter group. 
Once the foreign fighter has perceived the benefits of exiting the foreign fighter 
group, there follows the process of physically disengaging. Unlike U.S. street gangs, 
where the process is either gradual or abrupt, for foreign fighters it is always abrupt. 
Foreign fighter groups, specifically Islamic State, do not want foreign fighters to leave 
the group and will kill those who attempt to leave.257 In addition, because foreign fighter 
groups employ internal security, foreign fighters fear sharing their plans or seeking 
assistance in exiting the group, even from those they once considered friends. Therefore, 
“defection from the group becomes doubly costly: the cost of lost friendships and the cost 
of shattered identity forged in the crucible of underground activity.”258 This does not 
mean that foreign fighters are not disengaging from their groups. A Wall Street Journal 
article from June 2016 cited several Western diplomats who stated that “about 150 
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citizens from six [Western] countries have sought help” in exiting from IS, and several 
hundred other foreign fighters are believed to have returned to Europe.259 
Data regarding ex-foreign fighters assuming new social identities after they have 
disengaged from their groups is deficient, even though reports acknowledge that foreign 
fighters have returned to their country of origin. The issue with identifying and tracking 
these returning foreign fighters is that currently there is no incentive for ex-foreign 
fighters “to come out and share their story.”260 
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V. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MEMBER POST-DEPLOYMENT 
COMPARISON 
The other comparative model that was used for assessing the applicability of 
reintegrating returning ex-foreign fighters was the model developed for formerly 
deployed service National Guard members. This group was selected because of the 
experiences they have in foreign conflict areas and the extent to which the experiences 
are similar to those of foreign fighters. In addition, National Guard members represent 
the greatest similarity to a foreign fighter in that they spend a majority of their time living 
as civilians while serving in the military on a part-time basis. National Guard members 
may get activated and deployed to international conflicts in the same manner as active 
duty (full-time) service members, but less frequently. National Guard members train “one 
weekend (three to four days) per month plus an additional two to four weeks per 
year…and deploy once every two to three years for six to 15 months … allowing the 
service member to live as a civilian as well as a Soldier.”261 National Guard members 
while on deployment serve as full-time service members and engage in all the same 
activities as active-duty service members. The transition from civilian to Soldier is 
similar to foreign fighters who live as civilians, deploy to conflict areas, and engage and/
or support operations conducted by their foreign fighter group full time until they are 
killed or disengage from the conflict zone. 
When National Guard members complete their deployments, they return to the 
United States and reintegrate back into their communities, forced to resume civilian life 
much more quickly and abruptly than active-duty service members, who live and work 
among other service members and their families, who understand the military culture and 
deployment process. Foreign fighters may also abruptly return to civilian life after they 
exit the conflict zone.262 These similarities make National Guard members’ conceptual 
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life-cycle the most optimal to compare to foreign fighters, in terms of military-service 
member subgroup. 
The ongoing international conflicts that the U.S. military has been engaged in 
since 9/11 have provided researchers ample data points to assess on the conceptual life-
cycle of National Guard members from joining, to activities that National Guard 
members partake in on deployment, to redeployment back to the United States. 
According to Military.com, the largest military and veteran membership organization, 
“more than 200,000 Army Guard Soldiers have been mobilized for active duty overseas 
since 9/11. At one point in 2005, half of the combat brigades in Iraq were Army Guard 
units, and a Guard division headquarters commanded active-duty brigades for the first 
time since World War II.”263 
A. CONCEPTUAL LIFE-CYCLE 
While the focus of the comparative assessment is the post-deployment 
reintegration, I deconstructed the overall conceptual life-cycle of National Guard 
members. The following sections explore the conceptual life-cycle of National Guard 
members and foreign fighters, which show that National Guard members and foreign 
fighters engage in similar activities and share common experiences while deployed in a 
foreign conflict zone. The following section details the different motivations that cause 
individuals to join the National Guard as compared to foreign fighter groups. Within this 
section, the conceptual life-cycle process is broken into three parts—joining the group, 
supporting the group, and disengaging and desisting from the group. For each part of the 
life-cycle, the process that National Guard members progress through is detailed first and 
used as the framework to explore the foreign fighter process. 
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1. Joining the Group 
The physical process of joining the National Guard is formal, with a recruit 
signing a contract for a set amount of time.264 Since the U.S. Armed Forces became an 
all-volunteer force in 1973, a number of studies have explored why people join the 
National Guard and active-duty military, especially knowing the commitment and risks 
associated with enlistment. In 1977, Charles Moskos was the first to identify the two 
main motivating factors for individuals to join the military: occupational incentives or 
institutional incentives.265 Occupational incentives were the external incentives that 
accompanied membership, such as pay, benefits, technical training, and other enlistment 
incentives.266 The institutional incentives reflected “intrinsic” qualities of “duty to 
country, loyalty, and commitment [which] are seen as organized around the concept of 
readiness to sacrifice oneself on behalf of others.”267 
Subsequent studies over the next two decades confirmed the finding by Moskos. 
Analysis of the 1999 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) by the U.S. Department of 
Defense found that from the broad occupational and institutional incentives outlined by 
Moskos, five primary areas were most cited by respondents: learning opportunities (job 
skills and development of self-discipline), working conditions (teamwork and working 
with people they respect), external incentives (money for education and good pay), 
patriotic adventure (opportunity for adventure and doing something for their country), 
and equal opportunity (employment opportunities and harassment-free workplace for 
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women).268 Further analysis of the YATS by the National Research Council Committee 
on the Youth Population and Military Recruitment found that “patriotic adventure,” 
which is doing something for one’s country and engaging in adventure, was the greatest 
propensity for youth to enlist in both the National Guard and the active-duty military.269 
The propensity to serve has been a strong indicator of actual enlistment, with “70 percent 
of those who expressed high desire or likelihood of service actually enter the military 
within six years of high school graduation.”270 
In a 2006 study of U.S. combat Soldiers though, 70 percent of respondents stated 
that they had no preconceived plans for military service but eventually joined for the 
aforementioned occupational incentives.271 In the same study, enlistees were queried 
regarding the reason(s) for enlistment. The top four responses were: adventure/challenge 
(73.9 percent), serve country (65.8 percent), money for college (61.1 percent), and 
patriotism (54.9 percent).272 The responses by the enlistees reveal that while occupational 
incentives are the motivating factors to stimulate individuals to join the military, a duty to 
serve and patriotism are also very salient. 
Based on the previous referenced occupational and institutional incentives that 
motivate National Guard Members, Tables 3 and 4 outline the similarities and differences 
between the two groups. 
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Table 3.   Occupation Incentives between National Guard Members 
and Foreign Fighters273 
National Guard Members Foreign Fighters 
Learning Opportunities  No similar motivation found 
External Incentives Tangible Benefit Seeker 
Equal Opportunity No similar motivation found 
Working Conditions No similar motivation found 
 
Table 4.   Institutional Incentives National Guard Members 
and Foreign Fighters274 
National Guard Members Foreign Fighters 
Patriotic Adventure Identity Seeker/Thrill Seeker 
 
In addition to the marked difference in the ways that National Guard members 
and foreign fighters join their respective organizations, several other points of 
comparison stand out on each of these factors. National Guard Members are openly 
motivated to join the military for external incentives such as money for education and 
good pay, similar to the foreign fighters classified as tangible benefit seekers. The issue is 
that foreign fighter tangible benefit seekers are difficult to quantify because many of 
them proclaim to go to Syria and Iraq out of religious duty.275 Even with the majority of 
foreign fighters claiming religious motivations for becoming foreign fighters, a small 
number of them claim that one of the primary reasons they disengaged from their group 
was because “none of the luxury goods and cars they had been promised [had] 
materialized.”276 
Some National Guard Members are motivated to join the military for equal 
opportunities, such as employment opportunities and especially for women and 
minorities, a harassment-free workplace. While employment is not a primary motivating 
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factor for foreign fighters to join their groups as was cited in 2016 by Randy Boram and 
Robert Fein, “recent analyses show that this is not the reality for most foreign fighters, 
nor is it a strategy often used to recruit them,” yet it may still play a role.277 In 1984, 
Osama bin Laden offered to pay $300 a month for foreign fighters to stay in Afghanistan 
and fight against the Russians; foreign fighters to remain in the conflict zone and join al 
Qaeda were offered annual salaries of $10,000–$20,000 with benefits such as healthcare 
and vacations.278 In Iraq and Syria, the IS and Jabat al-Nusra also provide financial 
payments to their foreign fighters.279 
Individuals who were motivated to join the National Guard for patriotic adventure 
were the most likely to actually join the military. This phenomenon is also seen in foreign 
fighters who are motivated by religious rather than patriotic duty and to a lesser extent by 
adventure. These foreign fighters are categorized as foreign fighter identity seekers and 
foreign fighter thrill seekers. 
A review of the of the different reasons why individuals join the National Guard 
compared to why individuals become foreign fighters reveal that while National Guard 
members have a more diverse set of motivating factors causing them to join, foreign 
fighters are mostly predicated on occupational incentives. Interestingly though, 
individuals with the highest propensity to join National Guard cite patriotism, which is an 
identity-based motivation not tied to any personal tangible benefit to the individual, 
similar to foreign fighters who join their groups because it is their religious responsibility. 
2. Activity as Member of the Group 
Once a National Guard member has officially joined the Armed Forces, the first 
step is initial formal training. The first training that all service members get is basic 
recruit training. Basic recruit training is between eight and twelve weeks long.280 The 
goal of initial training is to take individuals and turn them into members of the team (in-
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group). In addition, initial training seeks to establish esprit de corps, to educate the 
members on the customs and norms of the group, to instill a drive to uphold the core 
values of the group, and to “prioritize group values over the goals of the individual.”281 
At the completion of basic training, all the Armed Forces branches, including the Army 
National Guard, require advanced training of their respective service members in a 
specific functional area.282 
All service members also go through the same four-step deployment cycle:  
1. pre-deployment phase—service members continue their normal training to 
maintain individual and unit readiness 
2. deployment phase—service members go to the designated area of 
operation or conflict zone to perform military duties in support of the 
mission 
3. post-deployment phase—service members return to their home military 
installation where they may receive “additional briefings, training, medical 
evaluations, and counseling”283 
4. reintegration phase—service members reintegrate with their families and 
their communities, in addition to returning to their regular military 
duties284 
For foreign fighters, the groups they join are militaristic and as a result, foreign 
fighter activities closely resemble the activities of National Guard members. When 
foreign fighters join a foreign fighter group, a majority of them engage in some level or 
type of training. Most of the training occurs in the area where the foreign fighter group 
operates and/or near the conflict zone.285 The cornerstone of the training is “extreme 
ideological learning” and group physical fitness to “establish an esprit de corps and … 
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operating [in a] group environment under a leadership figure.”286 This training aims to 
solidify commitment to the cause and to the group. The training is simultaneous to their 
joining the group and/or arriving where the group engages in activities. The amount of 
training that foreign fighters receive varies by their respective role, typically one of four: 
1. direct action—direct participation in combat and/or fighting 
2. operational support—direct support for direct action. May include 
identification and planning of targets, and preparation of weapons, and 
explosives. 
3. movement support—involves recruiting, financial management, internal 
and external communications. 
4. logistical support—acquisition and distribution of food, money, 
supplies.287 
Using the service member deployment cycle as a framework for comparison, the 
following demonstrates the similarities and nuanced differences between National Guard 
members and foreign fighters. Foreign fighters progress through Step 1, the pre-
deployment phase, except that foreign fighters may conduct their training in or near the 
conflict zone, technically during deployment rather than beforehand. Foreign fighters also 
go through Step 2, the deployment phase, where they conduct duties to support their 
group, traditionally based on, but not limited to, their role within the group. For Step 3, 
the post-deployment phase, and Step 4, the reintegration phase, foreign fighters usually 
go through Step 3 or Step 4. Because there is no formal post-deployment reintegration 
process, foreign fighters either demobilize or go someplace else and prepare for their next 
military engagement. Therefore, foreign fighters who go to Step 3 will likely transition 
from one conflict to another. This shortened process is observed through an exploration 
of the history of the original al Qaeda members, including Osama bin Laden, who 
departed Afghanistan after the Soviet–Afghan War only to go to another location to 
regroup and remobilize.288 These foreign fighters may receive additional training and 
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briefings but no medical evaluations or counseling. Foreign fighters who go to Step 4 do 
so directly from the conflict zone without a transition phase. The majority of these ex-
foreign fighters are looking to go home or to resettle someplace else and not reengage in 
a conflict.289 Again, they do not receive any medical evaluations or counseling. These ex-
foreign fighters must reintegrate on their own without any guidance. Foreign fighter 
groups are not concerned with the health or well-being of their members, and they are not 
concerned with the communities that the ex-foreign fighters are returning to, other than to 
attract more recruits.290 
The process of physically disengaging from the combat zone and traveling back to 
the United States for National Guard members and other service members is the post-
deployment phase. Once the service member has returned to the United States, they start 
to engage in the reintegration phase. Expanding on the reintegration phase of the 
deployment cycle, the DOD has identified that all Soldiers, National Guard and active-
duty, returning from a combat deployment need additional screening and resources to 
assist them in reintegrating back into normal non-combat life. While there is no set time 
frame for the reintegration phase, National Guard members may “experience a more 
extended reintegration period as they experience many significant changes and transitions 
back into a more permanent civilian life” than active-duty service members, who may be 
preparing for another deployment.291 The DOD has instituted additional tasks for both 
National Guard members and active-duty service members to complete throughout the 
deployment cycle, and specifically during the reintegration phase. During the pre-
deployment phase service members must take the Pre-Deployment Health Assessment 
(Pre-DHA) within 120 days of deploying, which must be re-validated within 60 days by a 
health care provider.292 Then, during the reintegration phase, service members are 
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required to complete “behavioral health-related tasks such as conducting suicide 
awareness and prevention training, and post-deployment resilience training.”293 All 
service members are also required to complete a Post-Deployment Health Assessment 
(PDHA) within 30 days of returning to their home base, and a Post-Deployment Health 
Reassessment (PDHRA) between 90 and 180 days of returning from deployment.294 
Each phase, including the original Pre-DHA—taken within 120 of deploying. consists of 
three parts: resilience training, electronic questionnaires, and an interview with a health 
care professional.295 
The reason for the multiple health assessments is that health care providers have 
discovered that combat deployment can affect service members both mentally and 
physically. Service members who have deployed to a combat zone, regardless of their 
role within the military, experience varying degrees of mental and physical stressors.296 
Depending on the length and kind of exposure to the previously referenced mental and 
physical stressors, combined with the individual’s perception and response to the 
stressors, some service members are at greater risk of clinically suffering from TBI, 
PTSD, and/or PMD. More than 20 percent of service members deployed to Iraq post-
2003 who were in high-conflict areas reported having experienced some level of 
traumatic brain injury.297 In addition, 14–22 percent of service members deployed to 
Afghanistan and Iraq post-2001 have been diagnosed with PTSD. National Guard 
members report higher rates of PTSD than active-duty service members.298 The rates of 
National Guard members being diagnosed with both TBI and PTSD range from 12–89 
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percent depending on several variables, including the “methods used to diagnose PTSD 
and TBI history (e.g., symptom questionnaires vs. structured clinical interviews).”299 
A Pew Research Center report on the effects of combat on formerly deployed 
service members revealed the following: 
• Nearly half (44 percent) of post-9/11 veterans say their readjustment to 
civilian life was difficult. 
• About half (48 percent) of all post-9/11 veterans say they have 
experienced strains in family relations since leaving the military, and 47 
percent say they have had frequent outbursts of anger. 
• One-third (32 percent) say there have been times where they felt they did 
not care about anything. 
• More than one-third (37 percent) post-9/11 veterans say that, whether or 
not they were formally diagnosed, they believe they have suffered from 
post-traumatic stress (PTS). 
• These psychological and emotional problems are most prevalent among 
post-9/11 veterans who were in combat. 
• About half of this group (49 percent) say they have suffered from 
PTS. 
• And about half (52 percent) also say they had emotionally 
traumatic or distressing experiences while in the military. 
• Of those who had these types of experiences, 75 percent say they are still 
reliving them in the form of flashbacks or nightmares. 
• Overall, about one in six post-9/11 veterans (16 percent) report they were 
seriously injured while serving in the military, and most of these injuries 
were combat related. 
• The survey finds that post-9/11 veterans who either experienced or were 
exposed to casualties are more supportive than other post-9/11 veterans of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, they also report having more 
difficulty re-entering civilian life.300 
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http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/10/05/war-and-sacrifice-in-the-post-911-era/.  
 68 
The Pew Research Report figures, together with the statistics regarding PTSD, 
TBI, and PMD in formerly deployed service members, reveal that some formerly 
deployed National Guard members are suffering from one or multiple types of PTS 
disorder as a result of being in a combat zone. Based on the fact that foreign fighters also 
operate in the same combat zones as service members, it can be safely presumed that 
some returning ex-foreign fighters will also suffer from a PTS disorder. Therefore, for 
successful reintegration to occur, returning ex-foreign fighters will require similar 
treatment for PTS disorders that formerly deployed service members do. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The goal of this research project was to explore opportunities for returned U.S. 
ex-foreign fighters to reintegrate back into the United States after they exited their 
foreign fighter group and were deemed a non-threat, using existing models designed for 
comparable groups of individuals. Based on the research described in this thesis, street 
gang members and National Guard members are analogous to foreign fighters; therefore, 
an opportunity exists to leverage the Comprehensive Gang Model and TFF to develop a 
reintegration strategy for returning ex-foreign fighters. This chapter first details the 
Comprehensive Gang Model and TFF and then constructs a returning ex-foreign fighter 
reintegration strategy using aspects of the previously referenced reintegration strategies. 
A. STREET GANG EXISTING REINTEGRATION MODEL 
The Comprehensive Gang Model contains five core strategies designed to be used 
in concert, with emphasis placed on individualizability/customizability: community 
mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and organizational 
change and development.301 
Community mobilization is getting the community engaged in the anti-gang 
initiative from prevention to reintegration. This aspect of the collective model “works with 
residents in the target area and community leaders to elicit their ideals and afford them a 
voice in identifying services and activities in the community” that would best support gang 
prevention, suppression, and reintegration.302 Also, incorporating community leaders and 
residents in the process provides them a sense of ownership in the results, making them 
more supportive of the gang/ex-gang members as they reenter the community and partake 
in the services and activities provided. 
Opportunities provision is providing job-related education and training to 
prepare gang/ex-gang members to take advantage of job opportunities specifically for 
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them to exit the gang as well as for ex-gang members.303 The goal is to provide prosocial 
economic opportunities to gang/ex-gang members to support their disengagement and 
desistance from gang membership. 
Social intervention is a strategy to provide social services to both the individual 
gang members and family and friends of the gang members “because these peers may 
contribute to target youth’s gang involvement [and/or disengagement].”304 The gang 
members and their families are offered a myriad of programs to assist them in “adopting 
nondeviant values” and also to find prosocial services and programs that meet their 
individual and/or family needs.305 
Suppression is a strategy to reduce gang activity through traditional policing and 
informal police contacts with gang/ex-gang members, their families, and friends. Police 
officers and other formal members of the criminal justice system work with other 
members of the community to develop “intervention plans, positive social contacts with 
target gang members, community mobilization efforts, and gang prevention activities.”306 
Organizational change and development is the process of ensuring all the four 
aforementioned strategies are working as one team, regardless of how active one strategy 
is compared to the others. Utilizing a team approach supports information sharing, 
activities planning, individual gang/ex-gang member progress, and ensures that the 
policies and “practices being used are community oriented, and with the interests, needs, 
and cultural backgrounds of local residents and target youth.”307 
As was detailed previously, gang members go through a process of disengaging 
from gangs starting with the evaluation of the pros and cons of gang membership. The 
Comprehensive Gang Model provides the gang member with positive alternatives to gang 
membership through the social intervention and opportunities provision strategies. 
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Working in concert with building positive alternatives outside the gang, suppression 
reinforces the negatives of gang membership by highlighting the negative consequences 
of committing criminal acts and being a gang member. When the gang member then 
explores alternative roles to gang membership both cognitively and physically, 
community mobilization, opportunities provision, and social intervention support the 
gang member in envisioning himself or herself in a prosocial role within the community. 
The prosocial role may be a mentor to new ex-gang members or simply in a job that 
affords the ex-gang member an opportunity to earn money the socially accepted way. 
Then when the gang member physically disengages from the gang, community 
mobilization, social intervention, and opportunities provision work together to provide 
the ex-gang member positive programs to aid him or her achieve the prosocial role(s) that 
was envisioned during the exploration phase prior to actual disengagement. The 
Comprehensive Gang Model in its entirety is critical to gang desistance. This 
multidisciplinary model is flexible and easily adjusted to the individual needs of gang/ex-
gang members from any cultural or ethnic background. 
The Comprehensive Gang Model has been successfully applied throughout the 
United States to target gang members and support them in exiting their gangs. In 2003, 
OJJDP conducted a five-year study of cities with large gang populations: Los Angeles, 
CA; Milwaukee, WI; North Miami Beach, FL; and Richmond, VA. Each city applied the 
Comprehensive Gang Model, varying specific components based on the needs of its 
respective local population. In Los Angeles, for example, the suppression strategy was 
uniquely applied, because it was “implemented through a partnership with an existing 
multiagency law enforcement collaborative, the Community Law Enforcement and 
Recovery (CLEAR) program.”308 Suppression can be equally applied through a single 
law enforcement agency or unit within an agency, such as with the Pittsburg Police 
Department (PPD) in California. As part of the department’s community policing efforts, 
PPD “aggressively targeted gang and narcotic issues and worked with property owners” 
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to prevent future gang activities by keeping their properties gang-member free and 
reporting any gang activity.309 
The outcomes in all four cities were successful.310 Some notable findings were 
that “outreach [within] the communities improved communication on gang issues within 
the target areas and researchers found evidence of improved communication among 
organizations…such as between law enforcement and service providers.”311 Also, each 
city had to adjust the model to “local conditions,” demonstrating that while the 
Comprehensive Gang Model is not a one-size-fits-all it is flexible and tailorable to meets 
the varying needs of different communities.312 
As was previously stated, there is no reintegration model for returning ex-foreign 
fighters. Based on the similarities of street gang members and returning ex-foreign 
fighters who were shown throughout this chapter, Chapter VI will recommend the 
applicable Comprehensive Gang Model strategies that can be utilized to successfully 
reintegrate ex-foreign fighters back into the United States. 
B. MILITARY EXISTING REINTEGRATION MODEL 
Reintegration in the military context has been defined as “the process of 
transitioning back into personal and organizational roles after deployment.”313 The 
concept of reintegration is a positive one, as National Guard members return to their 
families and to the creature comforts of home. The reality of reintegration is often 
different, with many National Guard members experiencing personal struggles, to include 
“increased tension at the personal, family and work levels and exacerbation of 
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deployment-related stress conditions.”314 According to an article in the Journal of 
Clinical Psychiatry, “a survey of service members seeking care from the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) following deployments to Iraq and/or Afghanistan found that 40 
percent of the respondents reported perceiving some to extreme difficulty reintegrating 
into civilian life.”315 
The DOD uses Total Force Fitness as its framework for maintaining the overall 
health and well-being of all service members throughout their military careers, with 
particular attention to successful post-deployment reintegration.316 The TFF framework 
consists of “eight distinct domains and five overarching tenets.”317 The eight TFF 
domains are: 
• Physical Fitness—the ability to physically complete missions uninjured 
and healthy 
• Environmental Fitness—the ability to conduct missions in any 
environment 
• Medical and Dental Fitness—the ability to meet medical standards 
• Nutritional Fitness—the ability and desire to maintain a nutritional 
lifestyle 
• Spiritual Fitness—the ability “to adhere to beliefs, principles, or values” 
• Psychological Fitness—the ability to successfully cope with mental stress 
• Behavioral Fitness—the ability to maintain a positive “relationship 
between one’s behavior and health” 
• Social Fitness—the ability to “engage in healthy social networks”318 
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In addition to the previously listed domains, TFF has five overarching tenets: 
• Total fitness extends beyond the Service member; total fitness should 
strengthen resilience in families, communities, and organizations. 
• A Service member’s family’s health plays a key role in sustained success 
and must be incorporated into any definition of total fitness. 
• Total fitness metrics must measure positive and negative outcomes, and 
must show movement toward total fitness. 
• Total fitness is linked to the fitness of the society from which the Service 
members are drawn and to which they will return. 
• Leadership is essential in achieving total fitness.319 
The goal of the TFF is to build resilience through a multidisciplinary approach 
that includes psychological, behavioral, social, and spiritual well-being of service 
members, their families, and their communities. The TFF is designed to be applied 
throughout the career of a service member, whether active duty or a member of the 
National Guard. Therefore, initial and recurring medical exams in addition to Pre-DHA 
should serve as initial indicators to identify service members who are in need of extra 
assistance prior, during and post-deployment. Also, the PDHA and PDHRA should also 
identify service members who require additional assistance post-deployment. For 
National Guard members, they must “cope with the challenges of civil society without 
the same support structure that a base, military medical facility, unit or comprehensive 
chain of command can offer an active service member.”320 
The DOD has several programs that utilize the holistic approach of the TFF 
framework, but “the common thread among all the services is the idea of reintegration as 
a multifaceted and continuous process that is holistic and comprehensive; a process that 
aims to sustain a physically and psychologically fit mission-ready force while aiding 
individuals, and those around them, in readjusting to post-deployment life.”321 
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C. EX-FOREIGN FIGHTER REINTEGRATION MODEL 
As part of the overall strategy to allow ex-foreign fighters to return to their 
communities, several aspects of the Comprehensive Gang Model and TFF must be 
mandated for ex-foreign fighters to maximize their opportunity for successful 
reintegration. First, all ex-foreign fighter reintegration models must include the TFF 
domains social fitness and spiritual fitness and community mobilization from the 
Comprehensive Gang Model, especially for Islamic foreign fighters who were motivated 
to become foreign fighters because they believed defending fellow Muslims is the duty of 
every devout Muslim. Social fitness, spiritual fitness, and community mobilization will 
aid ex-foreign fighters in maintaining their religious identity and beliefs but extract the 
extremist principles that motivated them to become a foreign fighter by surrounding them 
with positive spiritual community leaders and members. Social fitness and community 
mobilization will also assist ex-foreign fighters create new positive social networks that 
will serve their new in-group, and equally important, serve as the critically important 
countervailing pressure some ex-foreign fighters may need to prevent them from re-
adapting their extremists ideologies. 
All ex-foreign fighter reintegration models must also include the TFF domain 
behavioral fitness. Behavioral fitness is critical for the deprogramming of the justifiable 
belief in the acceptable use of violence by ex-foreign fighters by showing them socially 
acceptable behaviors to various issues that ex-foreign fighters may encounter. Behavioral 
fitness is also a critical aspect of reintegration for those ex-foreign fighters who were 
motivated by excitement, adventure, or revenge, by providing them a positive outlet to 
find excitement and engage in prosocial behaviors. Behavioral fitness promotes “healthy 
coping skills, [such as] exercise, spiritual activities, hobbies, and other creative 
activities.”322 
Ex-foreign fighters who traveled abroad in search of tangible benefits will require 
the Comprehensive Gang Models’ opportunities provision as a key aspect in their 
reintegration process. These ex-foreign fighters require vocational training so they can 
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get pro-social employment to earn their tangible benefits. In addition, training and 
employment can be positive life events that improve self-esteem and create confidence in 
the ex-foreign fighter.323 
The TFF domain social fitness and the Comprehensive Gang Models’ social 
intervention both work to ensure that returned ex-foreign fighters are validated as ex-
foreign fighters from their communities. This validation supports the ex-foreign fighters 
shift in identity from a foreign fighter to ex-foreign fighter because without validation of 
the new identity, the previously held foreign fighter identity may be triggered, which may 
also activate the behaviors that are acceptable within that role. Social fitness and social 
intervention also provide ex-foreign fighters and their families the social services that 
they may need based on individual circumstances. Presumably, some foreign fighters stay 
for only a short period of time in a conflict zone before deciding that they just want to 
come home, whereas some foreign fighters may stay in the conflict zone for a protracted 
amount of time. Based on a myriad of factors, including the role the foreign fighters had, 
the level of violence witnessed, and the ability of the foreign fighters to manage the 
mental and physical stress encountered, foreign fighters will have different responses to 
their experiences. Some returned ex-foreign fighters will plausibly suffer from a PTS 
disorder, such as PTSD, TBI, or PMD. To ensure that those returning ex-foreign fighters 
suffering from a PTS disorder get the appropriate treatment, all returning ex-foreign 
fighters should take a Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) as soon as 
practically possible. Additionally, all returning ex-foreign fighters should also take a 
Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) between 90 and 180 days after the 
PDHA to screen for any the disorders or injuries observed in formerly deployed National 
Guard members. The results of the health assessments could guide the exact health 
treatment that the returning ex-foreign fighters get, and provide the ex-foreign fighters 
the support necessary for successful reintegration. 
Another important component that all ex-foreign fighter reintegration strategies 
must include is the Comprehensive Gang Model’s suppression. Suppression is based on a 
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relationship between ex-foreign fighters and members of the criminal justice system, 
whereby the ex-foreign fighter is constantly reminded of the negatives of foreign fighter 
group membership and the positives of not being part of a foreign fighter group. 
Members of the criminal justice system work to remind the ex-foreign fighter of the 
consequences of identifying with or supporting a foreign fighter group either by 
conducting domestic activities for the group such as recruiting or facilitating. Suppression 
enables law enforcement and intelligence agencies to monitor and maintain relationships 
with returning ex-foreign fighters to make sure that no returned ex-foreign fighter is a 
threat to the United States. Equally important is the confidence that local law 
enforcement can instill within their communities that ex-foreign fighters are not a threat, 
which ideally aids the community in accepting the foreign fighter. 
The previously referenced multidisciplinary components of TFF and the 
Comprehensive Gang Model address the ex-foreign fighter holistically. Based on various 
motivations that lead individuals to become foreign fighters, taken together with the 
reasons that foreign fighters disengage from their groups, allows community leaders, 
social services, or agents of the criminal justice system to develop customizable 
reintegration programs for the diverse needs of returning ex-foreign fighters. 
D. CONCLUSION 
U.S. citizens traveling abroad to become foreign fighters, participating in 
activities in support of a foreign fighter group, and then disengaging and returning to the 
United States has long-ranging and long-term homeland security implications for the 
country at the national and local levels. The prevailing opinion in the United States 
regarding foreign fighters, based on the previously discussed U.S. strategies targeting 
foreign fighters, is that if U.S. ex-foreign fighters are allowed to return to their 
communities they will perpetrate acts of terrorism or they will recruit others from within 
their communities to become foreign fighters, where they will eventually commit terrorist 
acts against the United States. This research project has successfully challenged that 
presumption by revealing that a majority of foreign fighters disengage from their groups 
and return to their countries of origin because they were disenfranchised from or 
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disillusioned about their foreign fighter group.324 Additionally, if a foreign fighter did 
return to the United States contemplating but not committed to the previously stated 
nefarious intentions of attacking the United States, the process is not inexorable. The 
experiences and treatment of returning U.S. ex-foreign fighters may serve as a pivotal 
moment for him or her. A returned ex-foreign fighter “who [was] motivated to go to 
Syria by humanitarian concerns, [but joined a foreign fighter group for greater access to 
the affected people,] and has done no fighting may be radicalized and alienated if treated 
roughly on their arrival home.”325 
Establishing an ex-foreign fighter reintegration program is risky and complex but 
necessary. As of this writing, there are only approximately 250 Americans who have 
traveled abroad to join a foreign fighter group. These relatively low numbers afford the 
United States the opportunity to develop proactively and preemptively a reintegration 
strategy utilizing existing reintegration programs designed for individuals who progress 
through processes or have similar experiences to foreign fighters without overwhelming 
any community or agency. While this research project focused on Islamic foreign 
fighters, the recommended reintegration strategy is applicable to all ex-foreign fighters. It 
is scalable and duplicable in cities and communities throughout the United States. No one 
knows where the next conflict will arise that will attract U.S. foreign fighters. It could be 
Europe, as the European Union continues to struggle economically, or in Asia, as China, 
Japan, and Taiwan continue to compete for territory in the East China Sea. The point is 
that the United States needs to develop a strategy now, before another diaspora of U.S. 
citizens are engaged in a foreign conflict, and decide that they want to return home. 
E. AREA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research project explored the development of a reintegration program for 
returning ex-foreign fighters. It did not explore who the custodian of the program should 
be. Based on the various components necessary to meet the needs of returning ex-foreign 
fighters, U.S. government officials should bring together and meet with the various 
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stakeholders capable of providing the various services recommended so that they can 
identify and mitigate the various issues of developing and conducting a reintegration 
program for ex-foreign fighters including, but not limited to, the issues of program 
management and funding, confidentiality, and reporting; the numbers of ex-foreign 
fighters the program can successfully manage; and the metrics of success prior to actual 
implementation. 
Once these issues are addressed, and each stakeholder has acknowledged that they 
are capable and willing to be part of the reintegration process for returning ex-foreign 
fighters, the U.S. government should conduct a pilot program. Using a participation 
model for street gang members where they enter a reintegration program or face the 
criminal justice system, a returned ex-foreign fighter could be offered an opportunity to 
avoid jail or other aspects of the criminal justice system if he or she agrees to go through 
a reintegration program.326 Having returned U.S. ex-foreign fighters go through a 
reintegration program will provide the best feedback on what additional steps the United 
States needs to take to develop a robust program capable of handling and successfully 
reintegrating all returned U.S. ex-foreign fighters. 
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APPENDIX. IS DISENGAGED FOREIGN FIGHTERS327 
# Name  Nationality  Sex 
Date 
Disengaged Source 
1 Abdallah al-Sihli  Saudi  M 29/03/15 YouTube 
2 Abul Hakim Munabari Indonesian  M 1/4/2015 Jakarta Post 
3 Abu Abdallah  Saudi  M 23/10/14 YouTube 
4 Abu Abdullah  Syrian M 10/11/2014 Telegraph 
5 Abu al-Layth al-Ansari  Syrian M 1/11/2014 YouTube 
6 Abu al-Mouthanna Syrian M 6/11/2014 FNC 
7 Abu Ammara  Syrian M 18/02/14 CNN 
8 Abu Dujanah al-Libi Libyan M 22/06/14 Jakarta Post 
9 Abu Hamzah  Tunisian M 16/01/15 Jakarta Post 
10 Abu Handhala  Syrian M 23/05/15 Jakarta Post 
11 Abu Ibrahim  Syrian M 10/8/2015 Foreign Policy 
12 Abu Ibrahim*  Australian  M 9/2/2015 CBS News 
13 Abu Julaybib  Syrian M 6/5/2015 Jakarta Post 
14 Abu Muthena  Syrian M 30/08/15 NBC News 
15 Abu Omar  Syrian M 29/09/14 Buzzfeed 
16 Abu Yusr al-Masri  Egyptian M 27/05/14 Jakarta Post 
17 Adam Brookman*  Australian  M 20/05/15 The Age 
18 Ahmad Junaedi  Indonesian  M 1/4/2015 Jakarta Post 
19 Ali  Tunisia M 3/2/2015 NY Daily News 
20 Areeb Majeed Indian M 30/11/14 Times of India 
21 Ayoub B.  German M 17/07/15 Telegraph 
22 Bandar Ma’shi  Saudi M 13/10/14 YouTube 
23 Unknown Likely  Turkish M 14/07/14 BBC 
24 Unknown  Syrian M 25/09/14 NPR 
25 Unknown Syrian M 4/9/2014 CNN 
26 Unknown Syrian M 17/11/14 BBC 
27 Unknown Syrian M 23/01/14 Jakarta Post 
28 Unknown Unknown  M 15/09/14 BBC 
29 Unknown Turkish  M 27/07/15 NBC 
30 Unknown Jordanian  M 27/08/15 Khaberni 
31 Unknown British M 26/08/15 Independent 
32 Dua  Syrian  F 13/08/15 NBC 
33 Ebrahim B.  German  M 17/07/15 ARD 
34 Farukh Sharifov Tajik  M 5/7/2015 AP 
35 Ghaith  Tunisian M 3/2/2015 NY Daily News 
327 Source: Neumann, “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets,” 16. 
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36 Hamad Abdul Rahman  Saudi  M  3/2/2015 NY Daily News 
37 Hamza  Iraqi  M  17/03/15  NY Post 
38 Helmi Alamudi  Indonesian  M  1/14/2015 Jakarta Post 
39 Jamolbee Khamidova  Tajik  F  21/08/15  BBC 
40 Jejoen Bontinck  Belgian  M  11/3/2015 Guardian 
41 Khadja  Syrian  F  5/10/2014 CNN 
42 Majd al-Din  Swiss  M  8/6/2015 Al Monitor 
43 Mazlan  Indonesian  M  17/08/15  Strait Times 
44 Mufri al-Kathami  Saudi  M  23/04/14  YouTube 
45 Muhammad al-Sulayti  Saudi  M  7/4/2015 YouTube 
46 Muhammad al-Utaybi  Saudi  M  26/03/14  YouTube 
47 Muhammad al-Asiri  Saudi  M  13/10/14  YouTube 
48 Murad  Syrian  M  19/01/14  Telegraph 
49 Saleh  Unknown  M  10/3/2015 Sky News 
50 Maher Abu Ubaida  Syrian  M  31/07/14  Al Monitor 
51 Shukee Begum  British  F  15/08/15  Telegraph 
52 Sofiane  French  M  30/07/15  France TV 
53 Sulayman al-Fifi  Saudi  M  26/03/14  YouTube 
54 Umm Asmah  Syrian  F  25/06/15  Jakarta Post 
55 Umm Abaid  Syrian  F  13/07/15  PBS 
56 Umm Ous  Syrian  F  13/08/15  NBC News 
57 Usaid Barho  Syrian  M  16/12/14  NY Times 
58 Youssef Akkari  Tunisian  M  3/2/2015 NY Daily News  * There is speculation that Adam Brokman and Abu Ibrahim may be the same person, but this could not be fully verified by the time this report went to print. 
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